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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
A fascination with the mind and with psychology is not new to the field of narratology. In 
order to analyze and interpret literary texts, it is often necessary to draw from psychology as a 
reference, or further, as a method. Therefore, it is not surprising that, as research about (human) 
consciousness and the mind expands, the interest of narratologists has increasingly turned toward 
new results from and insights into the interaction between the story and the brain. Historically 
speaking, narratology, sooner or later, had to have a “cognitive turn.” Before we can speak about 
what this means exactly, however, one question must be answered: what are the reasons for this 
heightened interest in the mind and the brain? 
To answer this, I would like to focus on two major causes of such a cognitive turn: First, the 
research, especially on brain processes, offers a new perspective on literature, on its “interaction” 
with the reader’s brain, and broadly speaking, on the process of reading. When we know more 
about brain functions and brain processes we can also broaden our understanding of how texts 
are written. Of course, it is not my primary interest to make assumptions about the production of 
texts, but to develop an understanding of how to read literature and understand its affect on the 
reader. However, we may gain new perspectives and methods of analyzing and interpreting 
narratives based on the science of the brain and the mind. In other words, when we have an 
understanding of how the brain and the mind work, we can read texts with that understanding, 
and for example, actually start to see processes of the mind within narratives. 
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A second cause of the “cognitive turn” is the desire to broaden the understanding of the 
reader. As Umberto Eco points out in his Lector in fabula, we can find implied authors and 
implied readers in narratives; although he uses different terms (cf. Eco 74ff.). Thereby he means 
that the actual reader of a text will—independently of the actual author—create an image of the 
author within her mind.1,2 These constructions are the result of the reading experience. Having 
insight into the workings of the brain and the mind can help us to further reflect on the 
interpretations and methodology of hermeneutics. Furthermore, our analysis of the cognitive and 
neurological aspects of a text can become the foundation of a discussion that clears up certain 
questions, for example, what the text does to the reader. 
My intent is not to perform empirical research that brings forth statistical results, although it 
would be interesting to measure the accuracy of the theoretically based instruments. It is the task 
of neurologists and cognitive scientists to gather empirical data on brain processes as well as 
ways and means of categorizing them in conjunction with reading, remembering and 
reconstructing stories and interpretation. However, a narratological approach allows one to 
contribute to the system of utilizable categories to conduct such experiments. My focus is how 
narratological categories blend with cognitive processes as they are known today. The purpose of 
identifying the intersection of narratology and cognitive sciences is to lead to a better 
understanding of two major components: first, reception, i.e. the process of analyzing and 
interpreting literary texts within the reader’s mind (and brain), and second, on a theoretical level, 
                                                
1 The opposite is also true: The author will write his text with an image of a reader—although not necessarily an 
actual (or even probable) readership. However, it can be argued that authors do not always write for a reader; some 
authors may just write for themselves. I would respond by saying they then have themselves as “reader” in mind. 
2 Throughout the thesis, I will refer to the reader as “she,” and to the author as “he.” This choice is completely 
arbitrary and could be the other way around; of course, I talk about the reader and the author as operators. The only 
reason why to gender these categories is the readability of the text. 
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the intersection between data from cognitive sciences and narratological categories for the 
analysis of literary texts. 
Two basic questions thus constitute the driving force of the current interest in cognitive 
science and neuroscience within the field of narratology: First, what does the reader’s mind 
(facilitated by the brain) do to the text? Second, what does the text do to the reader’s mind? 
Before I go into the details of what this “cognitive turn” really means, I would like to clarify the 
terms “brain” and “mind”. I use the rather obvious term “brain” to refer to the physical, 
biological organ within one’s head. There are a variety of disciplines doing research on the brain 
by analyzing (among other things) physical, chemical, and biological aspects; their focus is on 
the specific processes within this organ.  
On the one hand, research on the mind is concerned with conscious experience. The mind is 
considered the non-physical “place” of awareness and consciousness, where we perceive 
ourselves and where our attention “sits”.  In other words, whenever we think a thought, pay 
attention to or read something, we utilize our conscious mind to do these tasks. The brain, on the 
other hand, is the physical, biological “operation center,” or device, “running the mind,” and 
facilitating the operations of the mind in a structural manner. Therefore, it is accurate to say that 
brain processes determine the mind’s ability to function; however, the processes within our mind 
we do perceive within our mind do not help us to understand the processes running in our brain 
in the background, so to say. For the purposes of our analysis of the reader’s mind and brain, we 
focus primarily on those processes that are mind-related and therefore lead to an understanding 
of the reader’s comprehension of a story as well as the way in which she comes to conclusions 
regarding a literary text. However, by “mind-related” I do not necessarily mean processes that 
are apparent to the reader; in other words, she might not be aware of certain structures within the 
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text, not because the individual is not able to identify such structures, but because, for example, a 
lack in training to see those structures that can be made visible through linguistic analysis. 
We now come to the questions that arise, along with the matter of what we gain, when we 
focus on the mind and brain processes. I would like to illustrate these aspects with the help of 
adaptation theory, which is exemplified when someone makes a movie based on a book. 
Generally speaking, when one reads stories, she, at the same time, builds images in the mind. 
One “sees” people, objects and places, and one also has no difficulty in determining how long 
the actions described in the story take.3 For example, we can easily differentiate between 
narrated time and narrative time. But the question arises as to whether the quality of those 
constructions varies depending on the author’s use of certain techniques and textual structures. In 
other words, how does the author make the reader think and imagine along with the story? Are 
there ways to make the reader imagine more and become more immersed in the story? Can we 
identify strategies that are more successful than others to make the text more engaging for the 
reader? Understanding the relevant factors in the mind that process texts, which lead to the 
triggering of imagination (and eventually the creation of certain expectations), allows the reader 
of literature to identify a certain type of structure that, intentionally or unintentionally, leads 
toward certain hermeneutic conclusions. In short, when we understand what makes the reader 
think and imagine, we can find structures in the text that have exactly that effect on the reader’s 
mind. 
                                                
3 However, questions of focalization remain, for example, regarding who perceives and experiences within a story 
and who tells the story. These questions require more thought and are not as easily answered. Yet, the fact remains 
that the reader eventually has a picture of the characters, objects, and events described in the book on the screen of 
her mind. 
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Often, one experiences the emotion of disappointment after having seen a movie based on a 
good book.4 The thoughts one has while reading a book form certain expectations with regard to 
a movie, which then are not always fulfilled and satisfied. For example, the characters in the film 
look different than they do in the viewer’s imagination, the voices do not fit those “heard” in the 
reader’s mind. We already have certain images of characters that depend, of course, on the 
description of them in the book. The premise that the director creates the movie in connection 
with her own imagination, which varies from that of other readers, leads to the necessary 
assumption that the construction of images indeed varies from reader to reader. 
Another important cause of the disappointment, with movies based on books that a reader 
might experience, lies within the nature of adaptation itself. As Linda Hutcheon points out in A 
Theory of Adaptation, three major perspectives on adaptations are relevant for explaining why 
the reader’s expectation from reading a book about seeing a movie and the actual watching 
experience do not match: adaptation involves “a formal entity or product, […] a process of 
creation, and a process of reception” (Hutcheon 2006, pp. 7). The first function consists of the 
process of transcoding, a change from one medium (a book) to another (a movie). The second 
function shows why the movie based on a book cannot be a simple copy of it; it always contains 
added and erased information, and it is partly created on its own. Therefore, an adaptation is 
ultimately a new text. The disappointment of a reader having watched a movie adaption stems 
from the difference between this reader’s experience of the book and the moviemaker’s reading 
experience. Therefore, we can see how there cannot be universal predictions about how these 
constructions emerge within the mind. Different people will imagine the same text in different 
ways; they translate them in images that vary individually. 
                                                
4 Numerous blog entries discuss disappointing movies based on books (Cf. http://www.ew.com/ew/gallery/ 
0,,20483133_20577348_21131377,00.html, accessed 01/16/2015).  
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The example of the movie allows for a new perspective on an important term that is as 
related to the theory of adaptation as it is to narratology: focalization. Although I will dwell on 
this concept a little bit further later on, I will briefly touch on it here to illustrate this category in 
context to films. Focalization deals with the question regarding through whose perspective the 
reader “sees” and experiences the story. This narratological category focuses on how the narrator 
tells the story to a reader and which perspective the reader and the narrator takes. Specifically, 
we analyze the following: who sees what happens, who tells, and who experiences what happens. 
Each of these focal points changes, of course, depending on how the author composes the 
narrative; the distinctions are easily understood if one considers the difference between a first-
person and a third-person narrator. 
The narratological category of focalization applied to making a movie based on a book has 
to address the question of how to depict “narratives”—basically, how to literally show what is 
written. Since in a film there is usually no explicit instance of a narrator who tells the story, the 
audience takes over the narrator’s role. It becomes a witness through the lens of the camera. The 
placement of the pictures into a coherent narrative happens on a mental level. On the level of 
adapting the book and creating a movie, the direction and the use of the camera have to translate 
the reading experience into a watching experience, and the images of the mind must be translated 
into an almost tangible reality that can be witnessed by an audience in a much more specific way, 
because the function of the narrator is divided between the camera work and the audience itself. 
Watching a film thus requires less imagination than reading a book. This fact underlines 
Hutcheon’s point that the adaptation is a recreation. The filmmakers must reduce certain parts of 
the text while others are expanded, or even just created for the (primarily) visual experience. 
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In a literary text, focalization basically describes the specific perspective or focus through 
which the reader experiences the story. How this experience unfolds then determines a reader’s 
analysis and interpretation of the literary text. Therefore, focalization is an important part of the 
reading and, later, the hermeneutic process. However, it is not the only crucial criterion. I argue 
that chronology, the order in which the reader experiences and perceives the events, is a major 
component that influences the reader’s propensity to assign a major theme to a literary text. To 
prove this argument I will focus on Georg Büchner’s play Woyzeck (1879). Although it is a play 
and therefore not a typical object of research in the discipline of narratology, I find in my 
analysis of it—as a narrative text (and not as a play)—some evidence for the claim that 
chronology indeed influences the hermeneutic attributes one assigns. 
I choose Woyzeck to provide evidence of the arguments above for two reasons. First, 
Woyzeck is only retained as a fragment; four different manuscripts exist but no final version 
exists, and one can only guess the proper order of the finalized scenes we do have. And, in fact, 
over the course of the past twenty years, scholars have again and again changed their opinion 
about how Büchner meant to present the scenes. Arguing from a structural standpoint, I will 
show how changing the arrangement of the scenes inevitably leads to a different outcome in the 
reader’s identification of the play’s major theme. Second, Woyzeck, as already mentioned, is a 
play, not a prose text. Hence, it does not contain a narrator. In other words, the important 
function of ordering falls back to the reader. She has to figure out the actual timeline of the story, 
i.e. the order or sequence of events as they happen in the story world. The timeline stands in 
contrast to the order or sequence of events as the reader learns about them, which I call 
chronology. However, the reader’s brain process of segmentation does not take place in the same 
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way it would with a prose text.5 Since the play consists of individual scenes, each scene already 
encapsulates segments of events that the reader can rather easily remember; in contrast to a 
novel, in which the reader continuously processes information and usually forms segments of 
events to remember on his or her own. I will come back to this point later when I talk about the 
importance of memory for the process of reading and interpreting literary texts. In any case, 
because the entity of the narrator is not apparent within the play, the effects of chronology 
become more obvious to the reader; there is no narrator filtering the reader’s processing of the 
story by making transitions between or within the scenes. Therefore, if there is no narrator 
between the reader and the story, the reader is closer to the story events, in terms of her 
experience of them. 
In the first chapter I will cover the connection between literary text and narratological 
interest in analyzing literature. I discuss the components that make up the structure of a narrative 
and explain some basic concepts in order to provide a clearer understanding of a narratological 
perspective. I will then introduce some basic categories that are important for eliciting 
hermeneutic conclusions. Concurrently, I will introduce cognitive mechanisms and processes 
that blend and align with narratological categories in order to show the closeness between the 
story, narratological perspective, and actual processes within the brain and mental activities.  
In the second chapter, I will describe the functions of narratological and cognitive categories 
in connection with examples from Georg Büchner’s Woyzeck, which I analyze through the aspect 
of chronology. I then show how the reader’s conclusions differ in terms of interpretational 
readings. 
                                                
5 Martha Nussbaum claims, for example, that readers generally read different types of texts differently than others 
and therefore follow different strategies of reading (cf. 5f).  
  9 
In the concluding chapter, I discuss the validity of using neuro-scientific material in 
connection with narratological concepts. I argue that the insight into the reader gained through 
the use of cognitive science and narratology produces a more effective approach to the questions 
of what a reader does to a literary text and what the text does to a reader. I will propose some 
components to add to the concept of the reader. Finally, I discuss questions regarding the value 
of expanding the classical narratological analysis. It is not only important to understand the 
reader, but also to discuss the reader in combination with the text and the dynamic that evolves 
out of this connection. 
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Chapter 2 
The text and the reader or the question of the 
chicken and the egg 
 
Generally speaking, we view the purpose of reading as a process of comprehending a text, 
which we can divide into different levels. One understands first, on a micro-level, the simple 
meaning of words and sentences of a given text. In terms of goals, the focus of the reader on this 
level lies on understanding vocabulary and grammar; in this way the reader grasps the basic 
meaning of what she reads. Understanding deeper meaning based on non-explicit interpretation, 
however, requires a higher level of reading. Accordingly, above the micro-level of 
understanding, an advanced form of understanding involves extending the boundaries the text 
sets. On this second level of reading, the reader applies the written content to the world, 
according to her understanding of the world, and utilizes this understanding to gain new insights 
from the literary text. What is interesting about this discussion of text comprehension and text 
interpretation is the fact that the reader is taken for granted while the focus is on the texts 
themselves. Generally speaking, the question arises: what was there first, the reader or the text? 
From a production-oriented perspective, one might argue that neither was; rather, the author was 
first. However, if we then take a closer look at the writing process itself, basically the same 
question applies, since the writer at the time of writing is also reading what is written. There is 
no text without a reader; this situation reflects Eco’s exposition for searching for the reader 
within the (literary) text, which I discuss in this chapter. Systematically, I begin with the text as a 
structural field in which one can analyze content, or more accurately, in which the reader can 
realize certain information. I then discuss the boundaries of what actually is in the text and how it 
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(the text) has “adapting” points that make the reader a necessary component not only for the 
realization of the story from the text that is encoded by words and sentences, but also as a means 
to bridge literary “gaps” (cf. Iser 38). This is information the text does not contain; the reader 
however needs to add such information in order to understand the story. Both information 
encoded in a text and information we know about that is actually not in the text, however, do not 
suffice as foundation for a reader model. Therefore, I argue, we need to turn to cognitive 
sciences in order to gain further insight into the reader’s comprehension and hermeneutic 
processes, which can ultimately lead to an understanding of the complete reading process.1  
 
Stories as linguistic structures 
When we consider stories as constructs of textual elements, one can analyze by undertaking 
a structural analysis, we have to assume that the structures of these stories are also relevant to the 
understanding of the story. Therefore, by analyzing these structures, we analyze at the same time 
the evolution of our reception as readers and the development of our understanding of these 
structures. From a neurological perspective, we can only identify certain structures within a text 
if we are equipped to do so. In other words, our mere ability to recognize structures in the text is 
proof that the distinct patterns we witness are also relevant in our brain processes during the 
reading experience. At this point, I argue that there must be a congruence, a certain symmetry, 
                                                
1 When I use the term “complete” or “final” in combination with reading or interpretation, I do not mean that the 
reader’s opinion about the text do not change. However, the process by which opinions change, either because the 
reader re-reads a text or because she discusses the text with a third party, remains the same. Therefore, I mean 
“complete” and “final” in terms of understanding all the processes and mechanisms, and not in the sense of the end 
of interpretation.  
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between the reader’s identification of structures and the structures implemented by an author in 
the text. 
For the purpose of categorizing these structures, the information within a sentence must have 
two functions in order to allow us to create a taxonomy. First, the information within a given 
narrative structure must be identifiable as such, and second, this information must recognizably 
vary in comparison to other structures. The main question therefore concerns whether one can 
find an underlying structure as the basis of literary texts that then defines a text as being a 
narrative. But even if structural elements indicate a narrative structure, not every reader can rely 
on this categorization; for example, she still might confuse fiction with non-fiction (e.g. a 
commercial). Therefore, paratexts must frame the text like book covers, so that the reader is not 
dependent on reading the structural information. The framing also establishes a certain 
expectation regarding a text and adds to the text its own structure.   
In order to understand the narrative as a structure, we need to know the components required 
to build it. Therefore, in the following paragraphs I give a short introduction to a narratological 
perspective on this issue and provide some key information. Historically speaking, the discipline 
of narratology has evolved from the field of linguistics. Since undergoing a cultural turn, 
narratology has loosened itself from its structural roots and undertakes research on a variety of 
aspects related to questions regarding what is key to storytelling. However, for the purpose of 
defining what a narrative structure is, I claim that an approach considering the linguistic basis 
underneath narratology provides some benefits. Basically, linguistics, especially syntax, has a 
“bottom-up” approach: in order to understand the syntactic workings of an entire complex 
sentence, the linguist analyzes the syntactic structures of smaller elements within this one 
sentence. The insights gained into how these smaller structures work then enable the linguist to 
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understand the sentence. Now, from a sentence level, information must trickle up, so to say, so 
that one can undertake a structural analysis on a textual level. Here we enter the field of text 
linguistics. In the next paragraphs, I explain some basic categories of text linguistics, so that we 
have foundation when we come to the specifics of narrative texts. 
One of the basic elements within text linguistics that is important in order for making this 
step from sentence level to text level is the proposition. In their introductory book Textlinguistik 
und Textgrammatik: Eine Einführung, Christina Gansel and Christina Jürgens define proposition 
as a „[g]rundlegende satzsemantische Kategorie, mit deren Hilfe der Kern der Satzbedeutung 
erfasst wird“ (Gansel/Jürgens 261). In other words, the value of the proposition thus lies in its 
ability to transport the information of a sentence on a meta-sentence or text level. Based on this 
proposition model, linguists then define texts, according to Wolfgang Heinemann and Dieter 
Viehweger in their book Textlinguistik: Eine Einführung, “als geordnete Folge von 
Propositionen, die durch interpropositionale Relationen miteinander verknüpft sind” 
(Heinemann/Viehweger 44). This definition helps, from a text linguistic perspective, to identify 
the information in a given text. 
An analysis of the hierarchical structure of these propositions within a text leads to what 
Teun A. van Dijk calls, in “Textwissenschaft: Eine interdisziplinäre Einführung”, a 
“Makrostruktur” or, more broadly, a “Textthema” (van Dijk 39). Technically, for the reader to 
know all the information of a given text does not suffice in order to decide what kind of text it is. 
The additional category of text function is required so that the analyst can identify the 
illocutionary structure; this approach is based on Searle’s speech act theory (cf. Searle 1969). 
This analysis allows, from a text linguistic perspective, the reader to determine the function of a 
whole text; for example, an examination of the illocutionary structure answers the question of 
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whether the text has an overall directive function or if it is an expressive text (for example, if the 
author expresses his attitudes or feelings).2  
I have been speaking thus far of the (text) linguistic approach to any text. The question that 
arises now regards the specifics of literary, narrative texts. To understand the elements of 
narrative structures, we have to know which system is relevant for determining uniquely 
narrative features. Van Dijk states that the information of the propositions within the sentences 
of a given text does not allow for a categorization of a text. Merely because the author provides 
certain information, one cannot know whether he employs this information in the environment of 
a story, in a description of something, or in the context of an argument. Therefore, functional 
analysis can help identify what the text does. The result of this analysis is what Van Dijk calls a 
superstructure. With a binary model, he thus shows the different levels of a narrative structure. 
Others have stated certain rules within a so-called story grammar. For example, as 
Bortolussi and Dixon summarize, 
a story consists of a setting followed by an episode, an episode consists of an event followed 
by a reaction, and an event consists of either an (embedded) episode, a change of state, an 
action, or an embedded sequence of events (102). 
This quote represents an attempt to show the constitutive parts of a narrative structure in a 
hierarchical order. In other words, scholars have shown how narratives present certain structures 
that seem to follow the same rules, and they have made the attempt to apply these rules to all 
different kind texts. Such structural discoveries have led to ambitious endeavors with the purpose 
                                                
2 Here coherence comes into the equation, too. In order for a text to be coherent, it cannot show gaps on the different 
levels. Incoherence therefore might be the case, for example, if certain propositions contradict each other. Coherence 
also involves semantic and pragmatic aspects. 
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of categorizing all narratives known and to create a list of all types. For example, Wladimir 
Jakowlewitsch Propp as a famous representative of formalism conducted research on folktales 
and their narratemes (the smallest unit within a narrative, as an analogy to morphemes, the 
smallest identifiable unit that contains meaning) (cf. Propp 1972). He found 31 different 
universal narratemes in his research.3 Results such as these lead to the assumption that there are 
grammar-like rules that govern the structure and the functions of narratives.  
To summarize, I have shown how the narrative as a certain type of text provides certain 
structures that, first, make the text a narrative, and, second, are not arbitrary. In fact, as we have 
seen with how Bortolussi and Dixon define narratives, a hierarchical order governs the story-
syntactic constitution of a story. 
 
How the text makes room for the reader 
By now we know that a narrative text can be identified by certain structural components one 
can analyze. However, before we can prove that brain processes and mental activities match the 
textual structure in order to construct comprehension—and later on build a foundation for an 
interpretation—not only do we have to search for the text “within” the reader, I also assume 
there is, in the first place, the structural construct of a reader within a text we have to understand. 
For the purpose of comprehending the reader’s function in combination with the text, we first 
need to understand how the text functions. After our exploration of the linguistic make-up of 
narratives, we can identify categories and elements that construct a text, which we need in order 
                                                
3 In his blog “Mindsigh,” Jerry Everard provides a brief but good overview of the different universal types Propp 
categorized (http://lostbiro.com/blog/?page_id=522, accessed 03/15/2015). 
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to know how we can realize certain structures. However, the question remains regarding how the 
text intends to communicate with the reader. Or, in other words, how must the reader interact 
with the text, so that she can have a satisfactory reading experience in which comprehension, 
interpretation and, ultimately, pleasure4 can occur? We cannot solve this puzzle by looking only 
at the pieces we have already identified. Moreover, we need to take a look at what is not in the 
text.  
Here I refer to what has been called gaps or “Leerstellen.” Eco takes the example of a short 
narrative, whereby he shows how much the reader needs to engage with a text in order to 
produce meaning, and at the same time, how well the reader’s mind performs this engagement 
(cf. Eco 62). Eco comes to the conclusion, “[d]er Text ist also mit Leerstellen durchsetzt, mit 
Zwischenräumen, die ausgefüllt 16arden müssen; und wer den Text sendet, geht davon aus, daß 
jene auch ausgefüllt 16arden” (Eco 63). In other words, the author’s intention to leave out 
information (deliberately or by default) is an intrinsic part of the reader’s ability to have a 
reading experience. Here we see not only how intertwined the text and the reader are, but also 
how the relationship between the author and the reader is manifested. The fact that the text needs 
the reader to work (by deducing from the given information and actualizing the text within the 
reader) leads Eco to the realization that the reader is structurally implemented into, or implied in, 
the text. Strictly speaking, the author implements reader-structures with certain functions for the 
actual reader to fulfill (who is a human being focusing on an actual book). These dynamics that I 
just circumscribed are the underlying concepts of what scholars in the field of narratology 
discuss under the labels of the implied reader (cf. Schmid “Implied Reader”) and the implied 
author (cf. Schmid “Implied Author”). In other words, Eco points out that every literary text also 
                                                
4 The aspect of pleasure or satisfaction is not dependent on the reading process and individual reader with different 
preferences will experience varying results. Here I refer to an (theoretically) optimum experience. 
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has this reader-structure and an author-structure. Specifically, authors inevitably implement a 
reader-structure by having assumptions about their readership and designing the text according to 
these assumptions. In contrast, the reader makes assumptions about the author based on the text 
and his reading experience.5 However, there is a difference between the actual reader and the 
implied reader. This is such that in some instances the reader might not be (intellectually) 
familiar with the vocabulary of the author, or their common set of vocabulary is very small, both 
which make it difficult for the reader to understand. In other cases the reader might “over”-read 
something, by which I mean that she adds meaning that the author did not intend to place in the 
text. In either case, the text works on its own with dynamics of which the author and the reader 
are parts, but in which the text develops its own unforeseen dynamics. In fact, both the actual 
reader and the implied reader interact with each other. Parts of the implied reader that the actual 
reader should actualize simply get lost. In other cases, the implied reader “knows” concepts the 
actual reader does not; however, the actual reader is able to learn these concepts by the way they 
are presented. In such an instance, the implied reader teaches or educates the actual reader; 
therein a dialogue emerges. 
In this problem we can thus see the underlying aspects involved in the communication 
between the actual author and the reader. The author (of a narrative) creates a text that inevitably 
has intrinsic structures: first, the author-structure, which realizes itself in the way the reader 
thinks about the author; second, the narrative content-structure, which usually consists of the 
narrator and the narrated content; and third, the reader-structure. Outside of this structural field 
                                                
5 Here one could ask whether the author intentionally implements this author-structure to create a certain image of 
himself within the reader’s mind, or whether the author’s ability to design such an author-construction is rather 
limited. Since the actual reader does not necessarily fit the reader-structure, an implemented author-structure might 
be an attempt to actually control the author-structure that is never totally in control. 
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we also have the actual reader who sits (usually) alone and who, parallel to some processes 
within the brain, focuses her eyes on the book. 
Considering all the components involved within the reading process, we can ponder this 
question: Can we contour a reader model that might be based partially on assumptions, but which 
has an overall foundation of knowledge of how the mind of the reader functions? One might 
suggest that the implied reader may give sufficient information about the reader to make 
conclusions. However, there are two main arguments refuting this idea. First, the reader-structure 
is author-based. In other words, the information we can draw from is based on the author and 
there are several problems related to this fact. The author usually implements and creates the 
implied reader-structure on the basis of his single point of view. The author might not know that 
the reader has to actualize the text, but instead, the author simply interprets his own fantasy, and 
therefore subconsciously implements a reader that is rather unspecific. Another problem is that 
the results of an analysis of the reader-structure stems from the conventions the author is used to. 
In other words, the model of a reader we would generate from drawing conclusions from implied 
reader-structures, is, at best, shaky. In fact, we cannot necessarily find any information about the 
reader if we rely on the author.6 Second, the most important reason we cannot rely solely on the 
structures within a text lies in the fact that those structures only sporadically contain information. 
Only the text and the reader’s mind together are able to sufficiently actualize the text. Similarly 
to the way in which the reader has to fill in gaps within stories to create a coherent story world 
(and to understand the text at all), the reader-structure in a given narrative is fragmentary and 
                                                
6 One interesting question to ask at this point is whether there are (narratively identifiable) texts without a reader-
structure. The answer, according to Eco, must be no, since a text that does not meet the requirement of being 
actualized and read by any means does not fulfill the basic criteria of being a text. 
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incomplete and at some point even indeterminable. Therefore, we have to turn toward sources 
that lie outside the strictly structural approach. 
 
The process of reading 
In order to find more information about the reader I claim that it is necessary to understand 
the process and the activity of reading itself. The function of the mind is especially important, 
because it is the common denominator first in reading comprehension and then in interpretive 
efforts. Here, I separate these steps strictly, although they sometimes actually occur as parallel 
operations during reading. Text understanding leads to interpretation; however, if there is no 
basic comprehension, the necessary foundation to build a solid interpretation is missing. I will 
cover the distinction between text comprehension and interpretation more thoroughly later in this 
chapter. However, theoretically speaking, they involve very different processes of the mind. The 
first process involves the one requirement reading comprehension generally must fulfill, and that 
is memory. One cannot understand a story without having the ability to remember it. Moreover, 
there are some specific aspects to this process. 
As Speer, Zacks and Reynolds point out in their article “Human Brain Activity Time-
Locked to Narrative Event Boundaries”, the brain segments every activity by dividing it “into a 
series of discrete units, or events” (449). Our brain orders, hierarchizes, and prioritizes the 
continuous stream of information in order to provide, at a conscious level, a basis for appropriate 
behavior. All these processes take place subconsciously, which means that to a large degree we 
are not aware of this segmenting process. The same mechanism that runs during the process of 
the real world runs during the reading process, but at another level. The text provides similar 
  20 
informational input; however, the reader’s brain does not simply process what it receives through 
the sensory faculties, it also needs to translate, in this case, the “ink spots” on the paper before us 
into meaningful words, sentences, and scenes. The brain then interprets the meaning of these 
events and gives them an emotional representation, i.e. an overall encoded memory of a 
particular event to which our first access is an emotional one. Once such an event is recalled, the 
“content” in terms of the specifics of a particular scene unravels and we access the whole (and 
completed) event. The act of recalling thus allows the reader to easily access the information of a 
story. Also, the emotional coding of the scene allows the reader to locate the scene in the bigger 
picture, although such a locating process is not always reliable, especially when the number of 
scenes in consideration is rather high, and scenes that do not seem as important as others to the 
reader are harder to remember.7 The process of remembering allows the reader later on to 
activate the memories of this narrative, therefore recall the story and enter a discourse by 
interpreting (the memories of the story). However, the process of memory activation is less 
accurate than one might expect because the scenes are not merely recalled, but literally recreated. 
In other words, the reader does not recall the events as they were described. Rather, the reader 
only remembers the basic situation and then creates, in her own language, a new text and literally 
paraphrases these events. However, in this case we have to talk about a derivation from the 
original text; in fact, we can say that the reader (re-)creates a certain narrative and thus that a 
new text emerges. This “re-creational” aspect is an important fact when we consider how we 
treat texts. In fact, for our understanding of interpretations we need to differentiate between the 
immediate interpretation and the final interpretation. 
                                                
7 Additionally, the recall process is rather restrictive, which one should keep in mind in the broader discourse of 
interpretation, in which the accuracy of recalling content does not seem to be questioned. In fact, when interpreting, 
the basis is often a perfect memory and absolute access to everything regarding the content of a given text. 
  21 
The former happens, as the term suggests, immediately during the reading experience. 
Immediate interpretation occurs sporadically and is less a rational process than an emotional 
hunch or a specific thought that occurs parallel to the comprehension process. Here Daniel 
Kahneman provides insight into understanding how this works. In his Thinking Fast Thinking 
Slow, Kahneman differentiates between two mental or cognitive processes that work not only 
very differently in terms of start and end, but also provide different information for the receiver 
in regard to their target: 
• System 1 operates automatically and quickly, with little or no effort and no sense of 
voluntary control. 
• System 2 allocates attention to the effortful mental activities that demand it, including 
complex computations. The operations of System 2 are often associated with the 
subjective experience of agency, choice, and concentration (21f.). 
In other words, we usually call the first system intuition; we activate or uitilize the second 
system when we deliberately turn our attention to something (e.g. an object or a question).  
 Therefore, the second process that I have identified, as the final interpretation, results from 
a longer cognitive interaction (system 2) with the details and the specifics of the text. 
Accordingly, we must involve the faculty of creativity in order to begin the second form of 
interpretation. Ultimately, it appears as if the first form of interpretation, immediate 
interpretation, is a further form of “digesting” the comprehension and results from the process of 
building emotional representations. Accordingly, such sporadic emergences of “blink” moments, 
as Malcolm Gladwell calls them, are then associated more closely with the text. The perspectives 
the reader forms and evaluates after the reading in a final interpretation then leverages those 
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moments, in which the reader forms opinions about the text. As a result the whole process of 
final interpretation is more efficient and uses fewer resources in terms of “working memory” or 
mental capacity. When I discuss the specifics of interpretation as a process in the second chapter, 
I will further discuss how exactly this mnemonic capacity functions. 
 
 
Travelling systems – narratology and cognitive sciences as 
neighbors 
By considering the actual reader and the memory involved in connection to other aspects of 
the reading process, we can see what constitutes text comprehension. The next step of 
understanding interpretation, however, consists in analyzing the interference of the actual reader 
with the text and what aspects are involved in this. Hence we can explore the field of 
narratology, which is engaged in identifying tools and instruments one can utilize to interpret 
narratives (from a reader-perspective) and thus arrive at valuable conclusions. The foundation of 
the discipline of narratology lies in between the text-linguistic realm we touched upon earlier and 
the pragmatics of a given text.8 In contrast to the roots of narratology in structural analysis, the 
more modern field of narratology appears to be more cluster-like with many different tendencies 
with regard to what is being observed. Parts of narratology are solely focused on theoretical 
                                                
8 One could say that the pragmatics of a narrative is predetermined by the narrative structure. This means that the 
reader knows what to do and how to treat such a text. However, this is not to be confused with the pragmatic 
utilization of a given narrative, for example in advertisements where stories are used for the purpose of a call to 
action, namely to buy a product or service. The former statement remains true, however, that within the story the 
pragmatic structures are predetermined; the ad in this example would be, hierarchically speaking, a superimposed 
structure with new pragmatic paradigms. 
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questions while others apply developed instruments to single stories, and others engage with 
genres. More recently, there has been interest in exploring in the field of cognitive sciences, 
neurology, and sciences of the mind.9 The reason for this “cognitive” turn lies in advanced 
technology, and therefore the new possibilities result not only in empirical studies but also in 
theoretical and at times even philosophical treatises regarding questions of perception and 
representations. For example, Herman suggests that stories are no longer isolated research areas 
that tell us about the time in which we live or help us understand the world in which we 
participate. In fact, reading and stories are much more intricately interwoven with the human 
ability (involving the mind and the brain) to perceive, to understand and to participate in this 
world. Therefore, stories are no longer mere parts of the world; moreover, understanding stories 
brings forth an understanding of our place within the world and our “participatory mechanisms.” 
This becomes clearer especially when we consider interpretive processes. Our way to evaluate 
interpretations of stories shows and involves processes involved in our real world experiences. 
Marie-Laure Ryan calls the result of bringing the reader’s world to story world “virtual realities” 
(cf. Ryan 25-28); in this way, we can see how both the real world and the virtual world overlap 
in regard to the mechanisms involved. However, story worlds demonstrate, in a much more 
controlled environment, the possibility of experimenting and learning about the reader, which 
brings forth new ways of thinking about stories. Such a consideration of experimenting with 
stories comes close to what Franco Moretti considers in his introduction to Graphs, Maps, Trees: 
Abstract Models for a Literary History (cf. 2); the methods of treating literature thus come closer 
to those of the sciences. Narratology already possesses elements that are intricately intertwined 
                                                
9 In this work I do not make a strict distinction between these different labels, because all of them engage, or have at 
least subfields doing such, with similar, in some cases even the same, questions. I prefer the term „cognitive 
sciences“ in my research because it is less restrictive (for example, neurology is closer to the functions of the 
biological brain, while questions about comprehension, memory, and consciousness are more general). 
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with aspects of the cognitive sciences, and it therefore provides the opportunity to outline such 
an experimentally interpretive approach. 
 
The power of the narrator 
The narrator functions as a regulator in the reader’s process of interpretation and 
comprehension. Therefore, the narrator, depending on what his or her expressions are, interferes 
with the reader’s imaginative processes. This interference either enhances the reader’s 
involvement with the text, or it hinders and causes resistance of the reader’s engagement. So, if 
we take a look at the results regarding the reader’s interaction with a text, we – almost always – 
have an unknown factor, namely how the narrator influences the movement of the reader’s mind. 
In order to eliminate this factor, we may turn our attention to texts without a narrator, but which 
are nonetheless narrative. As already touched upon in the introduction, the text of a play offers 
such a constellation in that there is no explicit narrator; however, the function of a narrator still 
remains. The reader takes over the role of creating a coherent narrative experience, hence she 
narrates to herself. The reader’s comprehension process thus results in the creation of an 
overarching narrative structure, which in and of itself allows one to understand the events. 
Vitally important for successful comprehension is the process I call emotional association, in 
which emotional representations build the hooks that allow the reader to “pull” these scenes out 
of memory later on. 
From a cognitive perspective on interpretation, we have to factor in these representations; 
however we do this from a new vantage point. It is simply not enough to point out that the 
narrator guides the reader to certain conclusions or interpretive points that then lead to coherent 
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understanding and comprehension, because the narrator really only provides a basis for such an 
interpretation. The reader has to deduce most parts from the narrative in order to be able to create 
a picture in her mind. The images on the screen of the mind then lead to an emotional impact, 
which is the effect that the images have on the reader. In other words, the reader becomes part of 
the narration, lives what is told, and therefore undertakes each movement the narrator allows the 
reader to take. 
How can we know what the reader does, and what mental movement the reader undertakes? 
In terms of understanding the picture and recreating the images in the mind’s eye, we simply 
cannot. However, we do know the structural processes involved in the reading process, which we 
have pointed out so far. From a different angle, we can say that the text functions as a “guardrail” 
in the following two ways: First, the reader receives an orientation which guides her imaginative 
movements. The overall scene that the narrator, or, more generally, the text, depicts simulates the 
reader to undertake imaginative acts. However, the reader not only acts imaginatively in an 
arbitrary manner; the reader also literally wants to make sense of what she reads. The only way 
to comprehend a narrative, ultimately, is through the imaginative act. 
Second, the text functions as a “guardrail” in the restrictive sense. The text allows the reader 
to imagine; at the same time, however, it does not allow arbitrary imagination. Especially in the 
hermeneutic realm, the reader needs to read very closely in order to prevent herself from 
implementing aspects that the text simply does not provide, or more strictly, does not allow. 
Therefore, the text frees and restricts the reader in her focus and at the same time in the 
imaginative act. In other words, the text also represents the boundaries of the contingency of 
imaginative acts. The question arising from this point is thus: how does contingency actualize? 
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In order to find a response, we need to draw on what Ferdinand de Saussure understands as 
the difference between the signified and the signifier. While the “signified” describes the actual 
thing or the image (in a person’s mind) of the thing, the signifier—a word or sign—is the carrier 
of meaning. The signifier is, generally speaking, arbitrary with regard to the signified. The word 
“tree” means tree, independently from the “tree-thing” in the world; the word does not mimic or 
imitate “tree-ness”; the term is unrelated to the actual tree-concept. To apply this theory of 
language to the meaning of the concept of reading we lay out here, one might suggest 
considering the following example. When a tree is described in a text, every reader has a 
different tree in mind (cf. de Saussure). The reason for the possibility of the imagination running 
wild, figuratively speaking, lies within the under-specification of the description of the tree.  
Now, if the tree is described in more detail and more thoroughly, more boundaries occur that 
narrow the range of taking imaginative action, and therefore increase the similarity of the tree 
imagined by different readers’. 
Now, one might assume that, if something is under-specified in terms of having just a one-
word description, the imagination “fills” in all the details not mentioned, which leads to various 
reading experiences. However, such a filling-in does not occur. The story world therefore is 
always different for each reader. There are as many story worlds as there are readers. However, 
each and every story world is similar to every other one. The reason for this lies in the restrictive 
function of the text. An important aspect of the “inner” creation of the story world is that there 
are conditions that interfere with the theory of imaginative prescription of the text. If the 
description of a certain object is too explicit, the text will lose the reader’s attention.10 To 
                                                
10 An interesting aspect in this regard is the actual reading moment of the reader. How much capacity must working 
memory have in order to comprehend meaning and how much information can build on the preceding content 
without overwhelming the reader and removing the constraints on the contingency of imaginative actions? In other 
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summarize, we can conclude that there are central factors that have to exist in an adequate 
balance and that these are demands made placed on the reader: deduction and imagination are the 
faculties of the mind responsible for a successful reading experience. They define the 
intersection between the text and the mind. 
Once we fully comprehend what happens within the reader during the reading experience, 
we arrive at a better understanding of how interpretations emerge. However, the reading 
experience is only one part of the interpretive process. Many factors are involved in between the 
reading experience and actual interpretation. 
 
The reader’s cognitive aspects 
The sciences of the mind or cognitive sciences have thus asked these questions about 
immersion and consciousness projection. However, they have done so almost exclusively with 
the underlying question of how the reader gains understanding and comprehends the text. Jeffrey 
M. Zacks recently published Flicker – Your Brain on Movies, which thoroughly explains what 
happens to the human brain when one watches movies, considering all the technology behind the 
production of these movies. There we can find a helpful explanation of how the experience 
evolves within a viewer. However, in order to see how interpretations emerge and how the reader 
of stories evaluates stories (based on her experience), we have to enter new territory. The main 
difference between the viewer of a movie and the reader of a novel lies in the fact that the 
viewer’s imagination does not interfere with the viewing experience, while the reader’s 
                                                                                                                                                       
words, at what moment does the reader stop reading the text and start to drift off with her mind, due to the wrong 
intensity of imaginative guidance? 
  28 
experience of reading a book is highly dependent on the utilization of the reader’s imagination of 
the events in the story. 
Systematically speaking, the differentiations David Herman suggests in his introduction to 
Storytelling and the Sciences of Mind can lead to a strategic overview of how to approach 
cognitive science in relationship to narratives. There he makes two basic distinctions: 
Distinction 1: (a) leveraging the sciences of the mind to investigate stories versus (b) 
drawing on ideas developed by narrative scholars to investigate focal issues in cognitive 
science; and 
Distinction 2: (c) studying narrative as target of interpretation versus (d) studying narrative 
as resource for sense making” (Herman 1). 
For the purpose of this work, especially the first distinction is important, while I do touch on the 
second as well in the sense that I distinguish between reading comprehension and interpretation. 
The first distinction, however, opens the dialogue between narratology and cognitive sciences. 
 
Immersion: Emotional Comprehension 
Ultimately, the reading process demands different mental states or, as Marie-Laure Ryan 
characterizes it, “degrees of absorption in the act of reading” (98). She distinguishes four 
different forms of reader involvement: First, “[c]oncentration,” which basically means the 
mental activity that occurs when one reads a difficult text, e.g. a philosophical treatise. Second, 
in (2) “[i]maginative involvement,” the reader is, at the same time, aware of what happens within 
the text and of how the author conveys it, e.g. in terms of stylistic devices. Third, Ryan calls 
  29 
“[e]ntrancement” the state in which the reader is not even aware of the fact that she is reading. In 
this state the reader has the experience of being in the story world. Ryan states, however, that at 
the back of the reader’s mind, she is aware of the fact that the experience is not real; there is no 
need to fear story events; the reader knows she is safe in the room or situation where she reads 
the book. Fourth, “[a]ddiction” describes the fourth state of absorption in the act of reading. If 
the reader is in this state, either she searches for escape from reality or does not have the capacity 
to discern fictional worlds from the real world  (cf. Ryan 98f.). While Ryan’s approach to 
categorizing mental states stems from a theoretical consideration, it is also important to consider 
what the sciences of the mind tell us about the reader’s mental states and whether Ryan’s 
considerations are accurate or whether results from research in cognitive science reinforce her 
assumptions. In my discussion of these degrees of absorption, I omit the fourth category, because 
it describes a psychological condition rather than an actual reading experience. There the focus 
lies less on what the reader experiences when she reads than on how the reader treats fictional 
texts psychologically and behaviorally in her real-life context. 
 
Conclusion: from theory to practice 
In this chapter I have shown how the reading experience works and what the difference is 
between text comprehension and interpretation. Further, I have distinguished two forms of the 
latter. Generally speaking, we see the dynamics between author and reader and how both are 
interrelated structurally. I claim it is simply not enough to work with the structures of the text to 
construct a reader model that answers questions regarding how interpretation works. Therefore, 
attending to the sciences of the mind or cognitive sciences becomes necessary. The reason for 
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this lies within the fact that we receive interesting data about media reception (for example about 
what happens within the brain during movies), but cognitive sciences have not yet asked what 
happens during the reading process. The reason for this lies within the involvement of unknown 
factors in the reading process. However, we can apply the theoretical considerations of this 
chapter in analyzing the considerations within an argument about the contingency of 
interpretation. In the following chapter I offer an answer to the question that now arises: how 
does the reader model (that considers aspects from cognitive science) add to the quality of a 
complex interpretation and reveal certain structures of a text a reader might not have previously 
discovered? 
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Chapter 3 
Time changes; or Woyzeck as a “guinea pig” 
 
Now that we know what a reader model looks like when we leverage resources from both 
the disciplines of narratology and cognitive sciences, we can turn our attention to a specific case 
in which the reader’s interpretation changes by virtue of changing the basic textual category, 
namely the order of the text. Throughout the following analysis it is important to keep in mind 
that the reader never merely reads a text, but that she also actualizes it (vividly) within her mind. 
Therefore, when I talk about the reader within the narrative, or within the story world, at the 
same time I always refer to the story world within the reader. In other words, the best way to 
show the inner dynamics of the reader model is to apply the principles we have discovered in the 
first chapter to a specific text, so that we can see and explore the different stages and steps of 
comprehension and interpretation. To illustrate how the reader’s experience changes, I therefore 
focus on the narrative structures themselves. However, because discussing all potential 
possibilities of how, for example, the reader accesses the meaning of sentences and their 
structure, is simply impossible, especially when we consider the ambiguities in the text, I will 
follow another strategy by using a specific example. 
 
Why Woyzeck; and why Woyzeck works 
I use the outline of a given text as a roadmap for understanding a literary text. For this 
purpose, I choose Büchner’s drama Woyzeck, which is particularly suited to our analytical 
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experiment of demonstrating the processes of interpretation discussed in the first chapter. The 
reason why especially Woyzeck in particular works for this purpose is that the play is retained as 
a fragment. A number of Büchner’s different handwritten versions of Woyzeck exist and I discuss 
them later in this chapter, but the main point is that scholars are not sure about how to arrange 
and order the different scenes in the play. Since there is no consensus on this aspect, the reader or 
the director (if she actually wants to make a theater or movie production of the play) is in the 
position of deciding how the play works best. Thus one has justification to play with the order, 
since the order-determining factor (specifically the author’s intention) is simply lost. 
Many have argued from the perspective of aesthetics and also of philology against such a 
claim. For example, J. Elema, in her article “Der Verstümmelte Woyzeck,” attempts rather 
convincingly to restore what she sees as the originally intended order from such a philological 
perspective, combined with the historical background of the text. She focuses on the four 
existing manuscripts and tries to identify their relevance for a theoretical “final” version. More 
importantly, she amplifies the claim that there is no justification for “opening up” the 
possibilities of rearranging the scenes. I argue against this approach, for in the process of 
“restoring” we also enter the field of re-creating. In other words, we as re-arrangers also become 
poets. 
However, for the purpose of demonstrating the dynamics of the reader-model I outlined in 
the first chapter, I restrict my “creative involvement” to allow to changes to occur. In fact, I will 
only change one variable, namely the order of the scenes, and nothing else. I will then show the 
effects of such “small” alerations. Before I get into the details of the analysis, I need to discuss 
the question of whether a play can be the focus of a narratological interpretation.  
  33 
The reader as the narrator of the play 
In order to apply what we have discussed to the first chapter to Büchner’s Woyzeck, we must 
find a definitive answer to the question of whether analyzing a play, as the object of a 
narratological perspective, falls at all under the scope of the field of narratology. Therefore, in 
order to confirm the status of a play as a justified object of attention, we need to prove whether 
the functions of a play follow similar structural rules in comparison to a literary prose text, or 
whether there are substantial differences we have to account for in our analysis. We must 
therefore understand first that we can find additional structures within a play that are not in a 
prose text and, second, vice-versa. According to Gérard Genette’s outline of the structures of 
narratives, which offers functional categories, the reader generally can utilize those categories to 
pursue a thorough analysis of literature and narratives (cf. Genette). These basic categories are 
duration, mode, and voice. In order to deploy those categories as technical terms of narratology 
and to indicate that we refer to them as such, I use the German expressions as they appear in 
Martínez’ and Scheffel’s Einführung in die Erzähltheorie, (which also adds a philosophical 
connotation to the discussion of these classes). As Wolfgang Iser points out in The Implied 
Reader, traditionally, 
the novel as a form in the eighteenth century is shaped by the dialogue that the author wishes 
to conduct with his reader. The simulated relationship gives the reader the impression that he 
and the author are partners in discovering the reality of human experience. In this reader-
oriented presentation of the period when the possibility of a priori knowledge was refuted, 
leaving fiction as the only means of supplying the insight into human nature denied by 
empirical philosophy (102). 
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Of course, Iser focuses here on the novel as a specific genre within a certain time period. With 
Woyzeck we therefore undertake an unconventional approach. First, it is a play, second it is from 
the nineteenth century. The question necessarily arises as to whether Iser’s aforementioned 
statement is by any means applicable to Büchner’s Woyzeck. In order to find an answer we need 
to focus on the similarities and differences between Woyzeck, or more generally, a play and a 
novel. The most obvious distinction between the two genres or types of text is, as I mentioned, 
the lack of an identifiable narrator. However, for us to know whether we have an intrinsic 
narrator (a narrator within the structure of the play, and not an external narrator, for example, in 
the form of a person) as a category within a play, we need to know whether we can find the 
functions of a narrator structurally implemented in the play. Such an attempt to undertake a 
functional analysis requires that we understand the nature of the narrative function, and 
moreover, its effects. In other words, once we have identified the same effect of a narrator in a 
novel in our play Woyzeck, we can then see the narratological parallels between the text type of a 
novel and that of a play. But before we come to a detailed analysis of the similarities and how we 
can find the narrator’s function within the play, we need to take a look at the Genettian 
categories and how they differ when we apply them to plays and novels, generally. As Martínez 
and Scheffel argue, 
Unter der Kategorie des Modus behandeln wir diejenigen Momente des Erzählens, die den 
Grad an Mittelbarkeit und die Perspektivierung des Erzählten betreffen. Es bietet sich an, 
nach zwei Leitfragen zu differenzieren und die unterschiedlichen Präsentationsformen des 
Erzählten nach den beiden Parametern Distanz und Fokalisierung zu erfassen (49). 
In other words, the mode is the category of narratology that focuses on the extent to which the 
story is mediated to the reader. Categorically, the mode generally differs between a play and a 
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novel. In fact, the most obvious difference lies in the presence of a narrator within a novel and 
the absence of an identifiable narrator in a play. Within the Genettian framework, the lack of a 
narrator can indicate zero mediation. In other words, the reader is as close as possible to what 
happens within the story, there is no stage in between. I argue that the degree of mediation, 
strictly speaking, cannot be zero, because mediation happens within the reader’s mind as the 
events take place. I propose a story test in order to prove how mediation happens in the reader’s 
mind. After the reading of the play (as in our case), if the reader is able to reproduce the events in 
a coherent narrative, then the reader takes on the role of the narrator (by definition). If the reader 
is able to produce a narrated version of the play, she has automatically deduced a narrative 
structure and put it in a narrative form, and she has also integrated the mediation. If this were not 
the case, then the reproduction of whatever the reader experienced would result in a different 
type of text; however, it would not be a narrative text. 
Since such a story test does work in the case of Woyzeck, we can assume that we as readers 
of the play have taken over the narrator’s function. Hence, we can abstract from the specific 
example of Woyzeck and generally assume that such a dynamic happens with plays in most 
cases. Therefore, the basic elements required to construct a narrative structure exist in the same 
way in a play as they do within a novel. The play, however, is apparently designed to adjust to 
different circumstances regarding its performance on a stage; this is contrary to the usually quiet 
experience of reading a novel. 
For example, Büchner’s Woyzeck, a play that is extant as a fragment, leads to different 
interpretive conclusions dependending on how the different scenes are arranged. Scholars 
attempt to restore a version that presumably comes close to the author’s intention. However, four 
different manuscripts exist. What makes a reconstruction even more difficult is the fact that 
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Büchner continuously edited and changed his manuscripts. One can see the difficulty of such an 
undertaking by merely surveying the vast diversity of varying editions of that play available at 
the bookstore. 
I argue that, depending on the order of the scenes, one can find at least three distinct 
subgenres1: Woyzeck as a crime story, Woyzeck as a character study, and Woyzeck as a social 
drama. Of course, all of the components of the story remain the same, which means that the 
reader can find all the elements of the choices above in every version. However, I argue that the 
primary reading, the structure one identifies first, does depend on the order in which the scenes 
are presented to the audience. Even further, if the reader identifies one of the masterplots above, 
for example the crime story, it becomes unlikely that she will identify another structure as easily. 
Even if the reader finds elements that do not fit a certain masterplot, they will not be given the 
same priority. In other words, once a structure is discovered, it is difficult to identify another 
structure as a complete one.  
Of course, this statement has certain limits. First, in order for a reader to identify a primary 
structure he has to have learned their features and how to extract them from the text. The ability 
to do so, however, is not connected to reading competence. In other words, the fact that one can 
read does not mean that one can easily identify genre, themes or topics. Hence, publishers have 
to indicate with paratexts, a pragmatic element according to Genette (cf. Genette Paratexts 1-3), 
whether the reader is dealing with a novel, a biography or a scientific text. They do this not just 
because the reader is able to identify more quickly what she likes in a bookstore, but also 
because a reader might misperceive, for example, a literary text for a history book. This necessity 
                                                
1 What I call “subgenre” is a deviation of Porter Abbott’s term “masterplot” (cf. Abbott). It is bound to certain sets 
of expectations, sets of desires, and their fulfillment. I choose the term “subgenre,” because it implies the reader’s 
ability to categorize a story-type. “Masterplot,” however, adds a hierarchical component and implies a structural 
predetermination without the component of the reader, who, in my terminology, assigns a subgenre to a text. 
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of publishers to label what kind of books and texts they sell, however, does not mean that the 
content and its structure signal to a reader how to identify a type of text in the first place.2 This 
fact precedes the necessary assumption that the reading of a story has a cultural component. 
However, not only biological but also procedural boundaries determine the working of the brain, 
which facilitates the mind. Hence, to a certain degree we are able to find general principles 
applicable to every reader. 
Second, in order to successfully prove this statement, another requirement is necessary: 
namely a certain degree of neutrality on the side of the reader towards the text. Especially 
regarding Woyzeck, if the reader is very well acquainted with this period of time, the historical 
and social environment, the major motifs of art within this certain epoch, and the typical 
characteristics of literary texts of that period, we can consider the reader to be biased. Her 
expectations would overrule her textually immanent hermeneutic approach to the extent that she 
would be able to identify the genre or kind of text we are dealing with even before she actually 
had read it. While reading the text, he would focus on information within the text that proves her 
presumptions, and, of course, he would find them. Therefore, the chronology in which the scenes 
in Woyzeck occur would not influence her interpretation. However, if a reader does not have 
strong expectations and she allows herself to address the text with an open mind, she might come 
up with other interpretations. Does this mean that the reader identifies a reading only according 
to her secondary knowledge about a given text? Of course not, but the point I want to make 
regards the propensity of the reader’s identification of a subgenre while reading. 
                                                
2 In some cases, the author might have particularly intended to create such an illusion to blur the lines between fact 
and fiction. Given such a case, even the best narratologist is unable to completely disambiguate the text on a 
structural level. 
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This fact leads to a third important restriction: Although Woyzeck, as I argue, can be read as 
“more” a social drama, “more” a crime story, or “more” a character study, the basic nature of the 
text does not change when one rearranges the scenes. And, the scholarship will always treat 
Woyzeck as a dramatic play set in the 19th century. But does this mean that an interpretation of a 
narrative is dependent on the reader’s expectations?  The possibility of identifying specific 
interpretations in such a way can stem from the particular chronology in which the reader 
“experiences” the scenes. 
 
When you change the order of the story, you change the story 
“First things first, but not necessarily in that order”  
—Doctor Who3 
As I have mentioned, I claim there are three different genres (or at least subgenres), each of 
which the reader identifies more likely than the others if the order of a scenes is arranged in a 
certain way. Up to now, I have been comparing such a “test” to an experimental situation in 
which the focus is on one single criterion being changed within the story. This one “small” 
change, however, automatically also involves the function of other facets within the text, not 
only those concerning the reader, but also those concerning the story itself. In particular, (re-
)arranging the scenes in order to have the outcome of various (though predetermined) 
interpretations affects some (traditional) narratological categories. 
                                                
3 Here I would like to thank Vanessa Ossa for finding the reference for the quote. 
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The first category is time. Strictly speaking, according to Geràrd Genette’s system of 
narrative, time would be the category of which order would be a subcategory. Martínez and 
Scheffel point to the narratological meaning of order as a criterion in their Einführung in die 
Erzähltheorie: 
für jeden narrativen Text [ist] ein zeitliches Nacheinander konstitutiv. Das gilt sowohl für 
das Erzählen (wegen der unvermeidlichen Linearität sprachlicher Äußerungen) als auch für 
das Erzählte (das per definitionem einen zeitlichen Ablauf darstellt) (34). 
In other words, a narrative cannot exist without the dimension of time. It always is a dimension 
of a story, and such in a twofold way: First, narrative time i.e. the time of narration itself, and 
second, the narrated time is also involved. For example, the concurrence or simultaneousness of 
certain events show how both categories can be independent of each other, because, although the 
events happen simultaneously, the reader learns about the events in a certain order. Therefore, a 
distinction between the time within the world of the story and, broadly, the reader’s time is 
necessary. 
 
The reader creates the time of the story 
In Genette’s terms, I thus argue that this analytical distinction between the narrated time and 
the narrative time is not as strict during the reading process as it may appear in theory, for the 
linearity of text forces the information flow to follow a certain pathway and thus creates a line 
along which the reader processes the story. For example, let us therefore assume that the reader 
reads in a novel about one event and then about another. These events are finite and each is told 
  40 
from the beginning to the end (in terms of erzählter Zeit). Theoretically, there are three obvious 
possibilities regarding how these events relate to each other in terms of time: (i) the first event 
happens before the second one; (ii) they happen concurrently; or, (iii) the second event happens 
before the first one. However, the reader experiences4 the first scene before the second one, 
regardless of the actual story timeline in which these events occur. In order for the reader not to 
have a certain impression or intuition of time, the text needs to contain certain clues or indicators 
that interrupt or disturb the reader’s inner sense of time. If the narrator does not tell us the 
relationship in which the events happen, the reader assumes out of habit that one happens after 
the other. 
According to this train of thought, the literary gaps are, strictly speaking, much bigger than 
just small holes in the larger literary text. We as readers have no difficulty dealing with these 
gaps because we have been socially and culturally trained to understand narratives and therefore 
know what to fill into those literary gaps. Even if we wanted to assume we do not know anything 
about the time within a narrative (in terms of what happens first), and if we were to stop trusting 
the order of a narrative, we would ultimately fail at interpreting it. Our mental capacity for 
considering events as individual items standing as equal elements next to each other is limited. 
Therefore, the reader will not succeed in text comprehension, since the task is simply too 
complicated. Ultimately, we have to accept the premise that the reader’s natural inclination is to 
read the text in a linear manner; first, because of the nature of the text, and second, because of 
the convention of story worlds. 
                                                
4 We assume that experience means an “average” involvement with and immersion into the story world, which 
means that the reader is alert enough to know what he or she is reading and is not drifting off in his or her thoughts. 
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As we have discussed in the context of event memory, each event or segment of a story is 
stored separately in the reader’s memory; the reader accesses those segments as finite events 
(with a beginning and ending) in relationship to other individual events. In order to so, the 
reader’s mind must process the information into finite segments, extracting them from the 
continuous flow. However, the ordering of the events happens both internally and externally, and 
all of that construction of episodic memories happens—to a certain degree—independently of the 
sentence level. In order to process the information and therefore to comprehend single events as 
outputs, the reader’s mind does not rely on the sentence-level of stories. Thus, the sentences 
might explain one aspect and then another of the scene without the reader thinking that those 
things happen one after the other. However, the reader’s mind is able to differentiate one scene 
or event from another and her processing of the events then leads to her belief that one event 
came after the other, except for cases in which the narrator deliberately indicates otherwise. I call 
this phenomenon the principle of event-sequence perception (PESP). At the foundaion of this 
principle lies the premise that, for the reader (just like in real life), one event happens after 
another and only one event happens at a time. Such events can be infinitely rich in content, 
depth, and complexity. The simultaneity of events, however, is something that the reader 
understands only in hindsight, and is therefore part of the “interpretive” stage of processing the 
text. 
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Woyzeck’s problem of order 
“Sehn sie Herr Doctor, manchmal hat man so n’en Character, so n’e Structur” 
—Woyzeck 
With regard to Woyzeck, the basic problem of order5 occurs because there is no narrator who 
indicates what has happened;6 for example, whether implications made by the protagonists are 
part of foreshadowing or whether they refer to events that have already happened. Therefore the 
problem of order is one the reader faces. Publishers who decide on the most common rendering 
of the play pragmatically rely on the results of scholars’ research and their suggestions regarding 
the question of how to arrange the play. Here the editor decides how the reader experiences the 
text.  
As we have seen, the order of the scenes in the play directly influences the perception of 
time within the story world. The reason for this influence is the fact of the principle of event-
sequence perception, which dictates that what the reader experiences first, the reader assumes 
comes first, if not indicated otherwise. This principle is part of text comprehension. When the 
reader (after completion of the comprehension stage) begins to interpret the text, the principle 
does not apply anymore, because the reader can then choose to deconstruct the story and to 
question the temporal implications. However, in order for the reader to question whether an 
                                                
5 My term “problem of order,” especially with Woyzeck, may imply that there is a (single) solution to it. Many 
scholars have attacked this particular play with the claim of restoring the text so that it reflects the author’s 
(Büchner’s) intention. I refute such attempts and try to redefine the problem of order as a question worth discussing 
especially with regard to the reader’s interpretation. 
6 To clarify, the focus lies not so much on the lack of a narrator but on the absence or lack of indicators 
disambiguating time relations. One may mistake this argument for an objection by saying that Woyzeck, or more 
generally a play, does not fit a narratological analysis since the problem of order results from the lack of a narrator. 
I, however, would respond by pointing out that there are also fragmentary prose texts in which the problem of order 
occurs too. In fact, having scenes as clear finite elements of the play makes it easier to discuss the problem of order. 
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event she learns about first also comes first in the story line, there needs to be a justification or 
even a trigger (like a logical or temporal gap in the text, or an extra-diegetic fact) encouraging 
the reader to do so. In the case of Woyzeck it is the extra-diegetic fact of incompletion that makes 
the reader ask what comes first in the story world. 
 
Change of order in terms of cause and effect 
In order to prove the argument that the reader comes to different conclusions regarding the 
subgenre within the process of interpretation by virtue of the order of the scenes, we need to 
understand the text comprehension process. Once we know how the reader comprehends the text, 
we can make some predictions regarding her interpretation.7 Therefore it is true to say that text 
comprehension affects interpretation. An alteration in the order of the scenes in Woyzeck changes 
the perception of time experience, which changes the interpretation of the play, I argue, with the 
reader’s propensity to assign a certain subgenre. The reason for this difference in the assignment 
of a certain genre lies in the fact that, as the (reader’s perception of) time in the story is changed, 
the causal structure of the story changes, too. Therefore, the whole structure of the story changes. 
In other words, the causal structures of a narrative generally are not explicit but implicit and the 
reader “decodes” this temporal structure according to the PESP. The next step in our analysis 
will focus on differences in the narrative structure. Before we engage in the discussion of 
specific orders, I list here an overview of all the scenes I discuss: 
                                                
7 Interpretation of a text, of course, relies on one’s understanding of the text. However, since there is an infinite 
variety of hermeneutic approaches, by “interpretation” I mean the application of a narratological system with the 
intention of gaining insight into the text. For example, what I do not mean is the analysis of the role of women in 
Woyzeck or of the function of society. What I do mean is, for example, the questions of genre, temporality and space 
within Woyzeck. 
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Table A: List of scenes from Woyzeck (published by Reclam in 1999) 
 
1. Freies Feld. Die Stadt in der Ferne. Woyzeck und Andres schneiden Stöcke im Gebüsch. 
2. Marie (mit ihrem Kind am Fenster) Margreth. 
3. Buden. Lichter. Volk; Unterofficier. Tambourmajor. Das Innere der Bude. 
4. Marie sitzt, ihr Kind auf dem Schooß, ein Stückchen Spiegel in der Hand. 
5. Der Hauptmann. Woyzeck. Hauptmann auf einem Stuhl, Woyzeck rasirt ihn. 
6. Straße oder Gasse; Marie. Tambour-Major. 
7. Straße oder Gasse; Marie. Woyzeck. 
8. Woyzeck. Der Doctor. 
9. Straße oder Gasse; Hauptmann. Doctor; Woyzeck kommt gelaufen. 
10. Die Wachtstube. Woyzeck, Andres. 
11. Wirthshaus. Die Fenster offen, Tanz. Bänke vor dem Haus. Burschen. 
12. Freies Feld. Woyzeck. 
13. Nacht. Andres und Woyzeck in einem Bett. 
14. Wirthshaus. Tambour-Major. Woyzeck. Leute. 
15. Woyzeck. Der Jude. 
16. Marie. Das Kind. Der Narr. 
17. Kaserne. Andres Woyzeck, kramt in seinen Sachen. 
18. Marie mit Mädchen vor der Hausthür. 
19. Marie und Woyzeck. 
20. Es kommen Leute. 
21. Das Wirthshaus. 
22. Kinder. 
23. Woyzeck, allein. 
24. Woyzeck an einem Teich. 
25. Gerichtsdiener. Barbier. Arzt. Richter. 
 
The Reclam edition also contains additional scenes, which were not published or—in the opinion 
of scholars—which Büchner erased. Within the framework of this paper, I will not discuss each 
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and every scene or whether or not certain scenes would add to the certain subgenres we focus on. 
In fact, adding or deleting scenes from the script would be tantamount to changing scenes, 
because then we would manipulate the informational content and therefore the narrative structure 
would change on many levels of the play. The argument, however, that the single factor of the 
order of scenes, if changed, can also change the interpretation, would in fact be undermined if I 
were to change the (for our purposes here) fixed number of scenes and their content. 
 
Scenario 1: Woyzeck as a crime story8 
In the following I discuss three possibilities for arranging the text. Let us begin with 
Woyzeck as a crime story. Traditionally, when we talk about crime stories, we, in terms of 
society, have certain expectations of what a “classic” crime story looks like. We expect a 
perpetrator to commit a crime and then we see somebody, for example a police officer or a 
lawyer, trying (and usually succeeding) to solve the crime. This is the basic outline of a crime 
story. Of course, there are infinite variations of this form. 
Considering the scenes in Woyzeck, we can already assume that some of these basic 
expectations about the story will not be fulfilled. We do in fact have a crime: in the Reclam 
edition from 1999 we find the murder scene to be the third scene from the end.  What the story 
obviously lacks is the police (or some other entity for that matter) investigating a crime. We can 
find the “Polizeydiener” taking part as the police’s representative in a court scene, but the 
function of the scene merely comments on the events; the informational content consists of the 
                                                
8 Although the term “detective story” is a more common term in the field of narratology than “crime story”, I have 
decided to use the latter term because “crime story” appeared to be more general. The term also is more compatible 
with the content of Woyzeck. 
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fact that the police discovered the murder, and that they react to it. Interestingly, the emotional 
impact of the murder on the police (who also represent society in its virtues and perception of 
justice) is mostly one of positive excitement, which is amplified by the expression “[e]in guter 
Mord, ein ächter Mord, ein schöner Mord,” (Büchner 40). One might expect their reaction to be 
rather one of disgust or contempt. Thus, we can see Büchner’s critique of society—or at least its 
system or perception of justice. 
Since the investigating element is apparently missing in the text, we are therefore dealing 
with a variation on the crime story. But how can we still have a crime story if the important 
element of the investigation is missing? The answer lies within the function of the reader. The 
element of the investigation is there ontologically, however, not in the text, but in the reader’s 
mind. In this way, the murder happens, and the reader becomes a witness to it. Therefore, the 
classical question of “who the murderer is” becomes—at least partially—obsolete. We are not in 
the situation of, for example, the Tatort series, where the audience asks the question of who did 
it. The detective story no longer falls into the category of whodunit (see Pyrhönen, 104) as a 
subgenre. In Woyzeck, we find ourselves asking two basic questions after the murder happens. 
Which of the following two questions the reader asks depends on the presentation of the crime in 
the beginning: 1) Why did Woyzeck kill Marie? 2) What happens next to Woyzeck? The reader 
asks one or the other of these questions in the beginning. The problem we now have to solve is to 
arrange Woyzeck in such way that it appears to the reader to be a crime story.9 In order to find a 
solution to this problem, we need to eliminate the possibility of that the reader might ask one of 
these questions about Woyzeck while reading. 
                                                
9 As I have said earlier, I will not make changes to the content of the scenes (for example in terms of characters or 
places), but merely to the order in which the scenes occur. Therefore, Woyzeck never really becomes a crime story; 
however, the impression the reader has during the reading experience reminds her of the narrative structure of a 
crime story, which therefore leads to the assignment of crime story as the subgenre. (The overall genre remains a 
drama, which is rather general). 
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The basis of imitating the structure of a crime story results, as already indicated, in the crime 
being placed at the beginning of the story. Of course, the murder thus does not need to happen in 
the first scene, but the murder should appear within the first fifth or quarter of the play. 
Similarly, with the TV series Columbo, the viewer becomes an eyewitness to the murder, 
knowing who the perpetrator is and how the murder happened, and the viewer sees the 
perpetrator’s attempt to hide the traces of the crime. In Woyzeck, the latter happens in the scene 
“Woyzeck an einem Teich” (Büchner 40), when he (Woyzeck) throws away the murder weapon 
and washes off the spots of blood (cf. Büchner 40). The reason why I do not suggest the murder 
as the first scene is that such a beginning would overwhelm the reader. Such a start would guide 
the reader to see Woyzeck not as a human but as a criminally mad person, a ruthless psychopath. 
Then the reader would ask himself or herself what is wrong with Woyzeck instead of starting to 
investigate the crime. In other words, the subgenre would move the reader’s perception more 
towards a character study than a crime story. 
As we can already see here, the reader’s assignment of the subgenre depends on the reader’s 
motivation in the form of unanswered questions (cf. Abbott 6). In (almost) every case, the text 
provides enough connecting points for the reader to find an answer to each individual question 
and therefore to satisfy the expectations the reader sets according to the order of the events. The 
reader’s expectation toward a text does not rely solely on the order of the first scenes and how 
they shape the reader’s impression and guide her questions, but also on factors outside the 
immediate reading experience. In this fact also lies the reason why the experience of reading a 
book again for a second time after a long period of time can differ tremendously from the first 
reading. In fact, having a long “digestion” period of a book and re-approaching it can lead to the 
reader’s reassessment in terms of subgenre. The major reason for this is that after the first 
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reading, memory processes and the segmentation of all the events happening in the story are 
completed. 
Thus, when the reader rereads the book, she may have—always to a certain degree—
different questions about the text than she had with the first reading. Concurrently, the reader 
remembers chunks of information from the former reading that both do and do not fit the current 
question. But the text answers new questions, too; therefore, it appears to the reader as if there 
are new things written in the book. Therefore, the second reading of a book is richer than the first 
one. 
In order to prevent the shift in the perception of Woyzeck as a character study (a question we 
engage with later on in this chapter), the reader needs to receive some background so she does 
not ask so much who Woyzeck is, but rather how Woyzeck came to this point. The reader 
therefore takes on the role of investigator regarding the background of the crime, the motive, and 
maybe even the justification for the crime. Ultimately, according to this reading, the reader 
decides whether or not Woyzeck is a criminal. The reader is thus police officer, judge and jury, 
all at the same time. The constitution of the subgenre within the phase of text comprehension 
builds on the function of the reader that goes along with the reading experience of the particular 
subgenre. 
In the case of Woyzeck, we now can discuss how to construct the introduction so that the 
reader will ask the question that later leads to constituting Woyzeck as a crime story for the 
subgenre of the drama. Table B shows my suggestion for how to order the scenes in order to 
implement the structure of a crime story: 
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Table B: Suggestion for the order of initial scenes for a crime story 
 
6. Straße oder Gasse; Marie. Tambour-Major. 
15. Woyzeck. Der Jude. 
7. Straße oder Gasse; Marie. Woyzeck. 
2.     Marie (mit ihrem Kind am Fenster) Margreth. 
23. Woyzeck, allein. 
24. Woyzeck an einem Teich. 
25. Gerichtsdiener. Barbier. Arzt. Richter. 
... 
 
The first scene shows us that Marie and the Tambourmajor are having an affair. The next scene 
shows Woyzeck buying a weapon, which for the reader apparently is a result of the affair, of 
which (in this arrangement the reader can be certain that) Woyzeck is aware. Then Woyzeck 
accuses Marie of being “sinful,” and the next scene depicts his murder of her. Before the crime, 
the reader learns about the relationship between Woyzeck and Marie. The reader experiences a 
constellation of jealousy in the interaction between Woyzeck and Marie. After the murder, 
Woyzeck attempts to discard the murder weapon. The scene with the judge follows. I define this 
set of scenes as the introduction or the first part of the play. 
As we can see, the time frame changes dramatically from how the reader experiences the 
events according to the Reclam edition; the causality of the events also changes. From this point 
forward, the structure of the crime story is set, because the reader will experience every scene in 
which Marie appears as a flashback, while every other scene appears either as a flashback or as 
something that happens to Woyzeck after the murder. However, the decision of this distinction 
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between whether something happens after a murder, or whether it is a flashback is part of the 
reader’s process of comprehending the text. In fact, one could create another possibility for 
constructing the structure of a crime story by putting the scene with the judge and the 
policeman10 at the very end. This constellation would leave open (for the reader to interpret and 
imagine) what led to the trial and what happens at the trial. In fact, the court scene in and of itself 
does not show whether Woyzeck is apprehended or not. By virtue of the shortage of information 
in the text the structure of the crime story decomposes. In other words, here the reader 
experiences and finds clues to the fact that Woyzeck is not a traditional crime story; however she 
would definitely be reminded of such a structure. Because the court scene is so short and 
conveys so little information, the structure of the crime story would remain more stable if the 
court scene were to occur at the beginning. The closeness between the scene with Woyzeck (24) 
and the trial scene (25) leads more probably to the reader’s assumption that it is Woyzeck who is 
appearing in the trial, although he is not in the scene (which again leaves room for 
interpretation). Towards the end of the play, however, the reader sees and recognizes a break 
within the structure of the crime story, even if the structure is outlined as I previously suggested. 
However, such a structure would remind the reader of structures of a crime story, so that she 
would identify them as such. However to conclude, Woyzeck, does not convey sufficient content 
to fulfill the criteria of belonging to the subgenre of the crime story. 
The absence of investigating moments is also the reason why I did not define the outline of 
the play further in the following scenes. The setup of the structure of the crime story in the 
beginning guides the reader’s mind toward the recognition of the features of the crime story. 
                                                
10 The very last scene that apparently (communicatively) functions as a comment on the events is rather ambiguous. 
The reader does not know whether he or she is at the crime scene, at a court, or in a completely different situation. 
From a 21st century perspective, the scene could also take place in a hospital. The fact, however, that a 
Gerichtsdiener is present, indicates that this scene is at a court. Therefore, I refer to it as the court scene. 
  51 
Scenario 2: Woyzeck as a character study 
If we want to present Woyzeck in such a way that the reader interprets it as a character study, 
in contrast to a crime story, we want the reader to ask different questions and therefore fulfill a 
different function. As already mentioned, the reader’s interest with this understanding should not 
focus so much on what happens or on what has happened, but it should rather concern the main 
character, namely Woyzeck himself. The basic question we want the reader in this scenario to 
ask is: Who is Woyzeck? What are his motivations, what drives him, what personality traits does 
he have? Is he mad, obsessed, violent, or just a misunderstood introvert? If the reader entertains 
such questions during her reading experience, the reader will more likely experience Woyzeck as 
a character study. Here we can already see how close the different subgenres are to each other. 
There is a very fine line between asking what leads to the crime and wondering about the 
character of the protagonist. Since the content of the scenes (except the story’s causal structure) 
does not change, the overall genre does not change (as the reader perceives it). Therefore the 
changes on the level of the subgenre leaning one way or another (for example, towards being a 
character study instead of a crime story) are generally subtle. However, we can identify when the 
subgenre changes. 
One way to arrange Woyzeck, as I have mentioned above, in such a way as would give the 
reader the impression that he or she encounters a character study, is to move the murder scene to 
the very beginning. However, this would not clearly indicate to the reader what genre he or she is 
dealing with, nor would it encourage the formulation of a question within the reader’s mind that 
subsequently would constitute the subgenre. The reader would additionally be overwhelmed by 
the amount of information, first, because he or she would not know Woyzeck and, second, 
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because he or she does not understand anything he says. Since the script does not show the act of 
the murder, the reader would not necessarily draw the “right” conclusions. However, if the 
murder were moved to the very end of the play, it would function as the climax of the narrative 
to which everything, in terms of events and dynamics, was lead. Then the focus of the reader 
would rather lie in the action and in what happens next. Thus Woyzeck would appear more as a 
person in the middle of a social environment who keeps different plot strings moving forward. 
Therefore, I suggest putting the murder scene in the middle of the play: 
 
Table C: Suggestion for the order of scenes for a character study 
 
5. Der Hauptmann. Woyzeck. Hauptmann auf einem Stuhl, Woyzeck rasirt ihn. 
2. Marie (mit ihrem Kind am Fenster) Margreth. 
16. Kaserne. Andres Woyzeck, kramt in seinen Sachen. 
8. Woyzeck. Der Doctor. 
14. Woyzeck. Der Jude. 
      6.  Straße oder Gasse; Marie. Tambour-Major. 
7. Straße oder Gasse; Marie. Woyzeck. 
22. Woyzeck, allein. 
23. Woyzeck an einem Teich. 
1. Freies Feld. Die Stadt in der Ferne. Woyzeck und Andres schneiden Stöcke im Gebüsch. 
3. Buden. Lichter. Volk; Unterofficier. Tambourmajor. Das Innere der Bude. 
25. Gerichtsszene. 
… 
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According to this order, the figure of Woyzeck appears opaque and uncanny; by seeing his odd 
behavior and manners, the reader soon has the impression that Woyzeck is not “normal” like the 
people who surround him. At the same time as this “opaqueness” is present, the reader wants to 
know more about the character. In the contrast between the different scenes with Woyzeck’s 
peculiar behavior we find the reason for the reader’s reaction. By arranging the play in such a 
way that the murder happens in the middle of it, the new order of the scene causes the reader to 
see how the murder changes Woyzeck’s character and amplifies any madness that the reader had 
already witnessed beforehand. However, throughout the whole play, the reader’s attention and 
focus stays on Woyzeck. He is the center of the reader’s interest. Of course, the reader will see 
Woyzeck’s stand within society and may even come to the question as to whether a social drama 
takes place here; however, since Woyzeck remains at the center of the reader’s attention, the 
reader’s interest concerns Woyzeck and his particular demeanor. By contrast, another question of 
subgenre concerns whether the array of scenes in such an order does not trigger the impression of 
a crime story. I think that the possibility of such a reading does exist. However, in this particular 
arrangement of scenes, the reader’s focus is guided more to Woyzeck as character and less to his 
(criminal) action from the perspective of an investigator. If one wants to choose what profession 
comes close to the reader’s function, the perspective here is more that of a psychological 
therapist. 
 
Scenario 3: Woyzeck a social drama  
While the difference between reading Woyzeck as a crime story and regarding it as a 
character study depends more on how the reader asks questions to the text, interacts with it, and 
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then processes the given information, the social drama as a subgenre is less dependent on the 
chronological order in which the reader perceives the scenes. The focus of a social drama lies 
more in the content of the scenes. We have to keep in mind that all subgenres depend on content 
and that to a degree the order of this content matters in creating a certain subgenre as well. 
Moreover, the social drama as a subgenre is less dependent on the structure of the order of the 
scenes than the crime story is. Furthermore, the social drama is also a subgenre that may be 
easily combined with other subgenres. For example, a crime story can thus be a social drama at 
the same time. In order to avoid such confusion, however, and to demonstrate how the order of 
the scenes does affect the reader’s attribution of the subgenre, we need to carefully avoid such 
interferences from different subgenres, although, strictly speaking, such overlaps (almost) always 
exist to a certain extent. For the sake of clarity, we consider the three subgenres to be separate, 
and in order to show the impact of the order of scenes, we want to create instances in which one 
of these subgenres occurs and the others do not. 
Indeed, I claim that there are factors with regard to the order of the scenes in Woyzeck that 
amplify the characteristic of a social drama. Generally speaking, and in contrast to the crime 
story and the character study, with the social drama the reader is concerned with the dynamics 
between society and the main protagonist—in our case Woyzeck. Furthermore, the protagonist 
often does not appear to be autonomous or really the one acting. Moreover, he or she is forced to 
behave or act in certain ways because of his or her social surroundings. In other words, society 
appears to be the (criminally) acting element, and the play then depicts the character as a victim. 
In order to guide the reader’s focus to such a constellation, I suggest following order: 
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Table D: Order of the scenes of Woyzeck as a social drama 
 
1. Freies Feld. Die Stadt in der Ferne. Woyzeck und Andres schneiden Stöcke im Gebüsch. 
2. Marie (mit ihrem Kind am Fenster) Margreth. 
3. Buden. Lichter. Volk; Unterofficier. Tambourmajor. Das Innere der Bude. 
4. Marie sitzt, ihr Kind auf dem Schooß, ein Stückchen Spiegel in der Hand. 
5. Der Hauptmann. Woyzeck. Hauptmann auf einem Stuhl, Woyzeck rasirt ihn. 
6. Straße oder Gasse; Marie. Tambour-Major. 
7. Straße oder Gasse; Marie. Woyzeck. 
8. Woyzeck. Der Doctor. 
9. Straße oder Gasse; Hauptmann. Doctor; Woyzeck kommt gelaufen. 
10. Die Wachtstube. Woyzeck, Andres. 
11. Wirthshaus. Die Fenster offen, Tanz. Bänke vor dem Haus. Burschen. 
12. Freies Feld. Woyzeck. 
13. Nacht. Andres und Woyzeck in einem Bett. 
14. Wirthshaus. Tambour-Major. Woyzeck. Leute. 
15. Woyzeck. Der Jude. 
16. Marie. Das Kind. Der Narr. 
17. Kaserne. Andres Woyzeck, kramt in seinen Sachen. 
18. Marie mit Mädchen vor der Hausthür. 
19. Marie und Woyzeck. 
20. Es kommen Leute. 
21. Das Wirthshaus. 
22. Kinder. 
23. Woyzeck, allein. 
24. Woyzeck an einem Teich. 
25. Gerichtsdiener. Barbier. Arzt. Richter. 
 
Table D has the same order as Table A and therefore also reflects Reclam’s recent suggested 
restoration of the original play. I chose this order because of its clear depiction of Woyzeck’s 
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status in contrast to that of other social classes in the society around him. As each scene follows 
the preceding one, Woyzeck’s relationship with different people of various professions and 
social backgrounds is depicted. All these interactions with characters and literally treatments, for 
example, by the doctor lead to the climax of the murder. The crime is the result of the society 
that to some degree formed Woyzeck and made him into what he has become. Therefore, the 
murder scene fits best into the ending of the play. With this scenario, the social drama as a 
subgenre is the necessary categorization of the text for the reader’s immediate interpretation. 
 
The reader’s perception: order à  time à  causality à  subgenre? 
By virtue of our project of contouring these structures of subgenres, we can see how the 
order of the scenes in Woyzeck influences the reader in the reading experience. Specifically, the 
order directly influences the reader’s interpretation of the text, although the reader might 
reevaluate this experience in the final interpretation and might finally come to other 
interpretations than in the immediate interpretation. We can thus define a causal chain that leads 
to the attribution of a subgenre to a certain piece of text.  
Particularly in Woyzeck, in which the narrator and reader are de facto the same, the effect of 
the order of scenes on a reader is important for her interpretation. We can see the effect of 
changes within the order as a more “pure” phenomenon, i.e. one without the interference of a 
narrator indicating any temporal or causal relations. All features that indicate such temporal or 
causal structures are either implicit within the scenes of the play or not accessible at all for the 
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reader. Therefore, we can see how the reader implements her own version of a temporal and a 
causal structure within the texts.  
The order in which the reader perceives the events and scenes therefore influences the way 
time is perceived. Here the PESP comes into perspective again because, as the reader perceives 
one scene after another, he or she experiences the time within the play. Only logical or implicit 
story gaps lead the reader to reconsider these structures of time. For example, the appearance of 
somebody who was apparently murdered in a previous scene would be such a case in which a 
logical gap occurs. However, if none of these instances emerge, the reader will have the 
experience of linearity in the play. If the order affects the reader’s perception of time, the causal 
structures automatically change, too. However, there are some exceptions to this rule, which are 
constraints on the causality-time-interdependence in stories.  
The first constraint that the causality-time-interdependence states is that only because 
something happens first does not necessarily mean that it also is the cause for a later effect the 
reader can witness. In other words, causal structures represent a different dimension than 
temporality and simply indicate influences of different objects on other things in a causal way. 
Sometimes causal structures are parallel to temporal structures (for example, one scene follows 
after a previous one, not only temporally, but also as a result of a causal relationship; thus a 
scene happens because of the previous scene). In another instance, several scenes take place in 
between two scenes, which are causally related. 
The second constraint of the causality-time-interdependence is based on the traditional 
reading experience and states that nothing can ever causally affect anything that temporally 
precedes it. In other words, once something has happened, it will not change as a result of that 
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which happens after it. Now, this statement is only true for the story world existing in its own 
line of time, and some attempts to break this constraint have been made (for example, in Martin 
Amis’ novel Times Arrow), but as a general rule of reading (that has its exceptions) it remains 
true and also is part of the reader’s expectation. Therefore, if for example, as we suggested 
earlier, a logical gap appears, a dead person suddenly appears alive again (without noticeable 
change), we then assume automatically that the scene does not occur after the murder scene. The 
reader thus repairs the logical gap. For the reader’s perception of the causal structure, however, 
the appearance of the murdered person (assuming we are not talking about a ghost story here) 
changes, too: after the reader has “witnessed” the crime, he or she automatically assumes that the 
second scene with the supposedly dead person is causally very important to the murder itself.  
To summarize, the causality changes to some degree, but not as much as the perception of 
time. Here we can ask the question of how or even if at all the causal structure influences the 
reader’s interpretation of the whole piece, so that the reader is eventually influenced by her 
assigning of a subgenre to the text. This previous question asks whether the reader therefore 
categorizes the text in a certain way according to causal structures, or whether other factors are 
more relevant than causality to her interpretation. 
To find an answer to this question, we have to focus on what constitutes the subgenres. As 
we have discussed, the (overall) genre (poem, drama, novel, etc.) does not change by virtue of 
conditions such as time or causality alone; other aspects within the text are more relevant for 
one’s identification of the genre. However, as I claim, order and time do influence the category 
of the subgenre the reader assigns according to her reading experience. And, as we have seen, 
from a top-down approach, these tendencies to interpret a text in a certain way suggested through 
a certain order do exist. The categories we have looked at, namely order and time are responsible 
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for the change in the interpretation. However, we cannot claim the linear dependency of causality 
and interpretation without also mentioning time as an important factor. 
Especially when we talk about the difference between the social drama and the crime story, 
we can see that those types of texts only differ in terms of in causality with regard to Woyzeck as 
being a perpetrator or a victim. With the social drama, society is responsible for the murder. 
Woyzeck is only the victim and he fails in his attempt to escape the structures of domestic 
violence outlined in the story. In Woyzeck as crime story, however, the ongoing plot and action 
in the play result from the murder. The scene in which the murder occurs is then placed at the 
beginning to implicitly indicate this causal structure. 
An advantage of the play as a genre in general is the fact that the time within each scene 
remains the same. In other words, since the purpose of the script is to facilitate an actual 
performance, the element of real time is inherent to the script. However, we cannot talk about the 
congruence between narrative time and narrated time, because the private and silent reading of 
the play script probably take less time than the actual performance of the play. However, the 
actual performance, as indicated in the dialogues or directions, remains relatively the same in 
Woyzeck. Finally, the reader’s perception of time in the play and her interpretation of causality 
together form the reader’s identification of the subgenre of the text. 
In the end, we need to discuss the limits of the influence of time and order and ask how the 
influence of order and the perception of time function cognitively. In other words, after having 
built a reader model that leverages both disciplines, the sciences of the mind and narratology, 
and after having analyzed the variations in the possible interpretations of Woyzeck with different 
ordering of the scenes, we now need to ask the question of how this interpretation happens from 
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the perspective of cognitive sciences. In the final chapter, we will attempt to find an answer to 
this question. 
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Chapter 4: Conclusion                               
Beyond the Boundaries of Narratology 
 
The reader’s purpose 
Following my analysis of the reader’s role in the different scenarios, we can see how the 
reader’s function changes, and therefore how the subgenre changes, too. Furthermore, we can 
conclude that the reader’s function is directly connected to her interpretation with regard to her 
identification or assignment of a subgenre to a given story. In other words, once we understand 
how the reader interprets and how she functions with a given story, we can see how the reader’s 
interaction with the text directly influences her experience, too. More specifically, if the reader 
sees the potential to interact with the text, her experience is part of the text, because the text 
allows and guides the interaction between the reader and the story. 
In the case of Woyzeck, the reader needs to fulfill at least three different functions: The first 
kind of functions is comprehension; the reader always has the task to comprehend what she 
reads. The second function is to imagine. The reader’s comprehension and imagination partially 
overlap, since the reader cannot understand the text if she does not imagine the events at all. 
However, if the reader begins to completely immerse herself in the events and scenes that take 
place, the reader’s experience gains an additional quality beyond the mere understanding of what 
happens. In other words, the reader’s experience turns more into the experience of a story rather 
than the mere comprehension of events from the story. The fact that the reader has to imagine 
what takes place on the screen of her mind is especially true for the reader of a play such as 
Woyzeck. 
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Since Woyzeck is a play, there is no narrator mediating the story to the reader. Therefore, the 
imaginative act is even more necessary in the case of Woyzeck than it is in a novel, in which 
events unfold independently of the reading time; narrated time and narrative time can 
tremendously vary with a novel. However, in Woyzeck, since the intention behind the play as a 
medium is to achieve a performance on stage with actors, each event that takes place in front of 
the viewer must be in real time; in other words, the viewer must be able to discern and to 
experience what happens in front of her. The reader of the play—in contrast to the viewer—has 
to utilize her imagination more strongly, because none of the elements on which the director and 
the theater crew would normally decide in order to create a performance are in the play, except 
for basic indications of actions, settings, and situations.  
However, comprehension and imagination are not the only functions the reader has to fulfill; 
she also needs to remember the different events; furthermore, she needs to deduce interrelating 
structures in terms of time and causality. In the case of Woyzeck the task is particularly 
complicated, because in order to comprehend the play the reader needs to identify temporal and 
causal relationships. In addition to these categories, there is also a limit to how much 
comprehension is possible, and at a certain point the reader has to actualize particular gaps that 
are underspecified and therefore ambiguous. From those gaps on, the reader can only interpret 
and more or less guess on the basis of her understanding what specifically happens in the scenes 
(or in between different scenes). 
In the second chapter, we saw how the reader draws conclusions about time and the timeline 
in the story world. To summarize, the reader has the expectation that—if not indicated 
otherwise—the scene or event that comes first in terms of the description in the text also comes 
first in the story world. I call this phenomenon the principle of event-sequence perception 
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(PESP). PESP is the first important step of the reader’s processing of the text in terms of order 
and causality. The second step consists of following the guidance the text offers and therefore 
asking questions of the text. As we saw in the third chapter, for example, the difference between 
the crime story and the character study consists of the difference between the question of what 
happens to Woyzeck next (the crime story) and the question of who he is Woyzeck (the character 
study). Therefore, the reader’s question and the text prodding of the reader to ask these questions 
lead to the construction of the subgenre. 
Generally speaking, we can categorize these functions the reader fulfills. For the crime story 
as an example, although one might argue that the lack of a detective defies the categorization of 
Woyzeck as a crime story. However, if take a look at what the reader basically does when we 
change the order of the scenes, as I suggested in the third chapter, we can find the aspect of the 
investigator to be ontologically present. However, if one reads Woyzeck with a different order of 
the scenes the element of investigation is completely missing. The reason for the difference is 
that the aspect of the investigator is only actualized and realized on the reader’s part. The order 
of the scenes alone in Woyzeck allows the reader to experience the representation of the detective 
or the investigator. 
Therefore, the category of order is especially important, not only because it determines the 
subgenre the reader assigns to a text in her interpretation, but also because order is responsible 
for features like the presence or absence of the function of an investigator, even though a 
structural analysis does not show any evidence of this function. From a narratological 
perspective, now that we know that order retains the possibility of adding and erasing features of 
a text, we can see how the different narratological categories Genette introduced reach their 
limits. 
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The paradigm of the discipline of narratology is the idea that all components of a story are 
structurally implemented within a text and that the reader therefore has an experience according 
to such a structure. However, the case of Woyzeck demonstrates how the structures one wants to 
define by undertaking a narratological analysis are interdependent and overlap. In fact, although 
Genette clearly distinguishes between time and order, Woyzeck proves how in a case where there 
is a lack of a narrator in a play these categories not only interfere with each other, but also 
constitute each other. Furthermore, the reader as a variable in a dialogue or interaction with the 
text introduces a certain contingency regarding how the text may be interpreted and how 
therefore different interpretations occur. Genette’s terms and categories thus dissolve and 
become aspects of stories and their interpretations rather than independent analytical categories 
for analyzing stories. From the perspective of narratology, we can see that the boundaries of time 
and causal structures lie in the scope of the narrator and not in the content of the events in terms 
of what happens. We can thus see that some of the Genettian categories, which narratologists 
assume are an intrinsic part of the story, are less easily identifiable for the reader as parts or 
aspects of the story; in other words, the categories of narrated time, narrative time and causality 
completely depend on the order in which the reader perceives the events and scenes. Therefore 
these categories are interrelated. 
 
The limits of narratology and beyond 
Narratological discourse reveals its boundaries especially in the discussion of order, time, 
and chronology and their impact on the reader’s interpretation. In classical structural narratology, 
the reader’s contingency of experience and interaction with the text do not belong in a 
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narratological account. The lack of this consideration of the reader as part of the analysis thus 
would form the boundaries of narratology, if we did not extend the scope of the analytical 
repertoire with which we analyze literature. Therefore, to include the reader as an instance in 
narratological discourse, we need to incorporate cognitive science and its focus on the human 
mind into narratological exposition. In other words, the structural approach underlying the 
discipline of narratology is insufficient for a broad interpretation of a text. As I have discussed, a 
structural analysis only reveals the information in a given story, but it does not show the 
information that the reader has to add by filling out the literary gaps with his imagination. Only 
when we consider a basic reader model featuring cognitive aspects and components can we gain 
insights on how interpretation works and what mechanisms are involved in it. 
The text’s realization of the different subgenres we discussed in the third chapter is 
dependent on reader’s cognitive capacities and her training in, or knowledge of different 
subgenres one can generally identify; for a reader to interpret a narrative as a crime story she 
needs to know what a structure of a crime story looks like. The reader’s training in identifying 
subgenres and her acquaintance with narrative structures in general, however, remains an 
unknown factor. In order to receive reliable results from analyses one would have to use 
statistical data about the target reader, as Moretti suggests. However, the cognitive information 
we have about the reader can lead to an expanded view on the field of narratology. 
 
Order and interpretation  
In order to verify the changes in interpretation regarding the order of a story, we need to take 
a closer look at how the reader’s internal process of interpretation works and what stages are 
  66 
important for it. The basic distinction we need to make in the process of reading is between 
comprehension and interpretation. As we have discussed in the first chapter, the phases or stages 
the reader goes through occur to a large degree simultaneously; however, we can distinguish the 
systems operating according to their functions and the results they produce. Generally speaking, 
the reader understands the text on what we can call a language level or sentence level, which 
means that she processes and therefore understands the information in a text on the basis of the 
meaning of words and sentences. On a higher level the reader recognizes certain events that are 
separate from other events. This realization of different events and the segmentation of the text 
into different events happen without the reader being aware of the process. However, the results 
of this process of segmentation are emotional representations. More specifically, if the reader 
wants to recall certain scenes, for example, when she discusses the text later on, these 
representations allow the reader to reconstruct the events according to the emotional experience 
of the events during the reading experience. It is thus accurate to say that the more immersed the 
reader is, the more probable it is that she can recall a particular instance in the story later on1.  
 From the perspective of cognitive science, memories, i.e. images and experiences that one 
can recall, are representations in the mind of these events (cf. Sutton 2010). Therefore, for the 
recognition of subgenres in overall structures, the emotional representations I touched upon in 
the first chapter are key for the reader’s perception of time in the story world. 
 
                                                
1 Of course, there are other factors involved in and relevant to the recalling of scenes. Simply because the reader had 
an immersive experience does not necessarily mean that she must remember it. However, if she does remember it, 
the memory is probably rather vivid. As, Robert Schwarz and Stephen Gittigan bluntly describe it in an analogy, 
 “most memory research […] is really about the distortion of details, not central events. A person hit by a car may 
misremember its color, or the day of the week, but will rarely confuse being hit by a car with, say, falling down a 
mountain” (21). 
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Keeping the memory in mind 
We have to keep in mind that the process of recalling does not produce an exact replica of 
the text read earlier. Specifically, the reader reconstructs and recreates her own text and thus 
literally forms an adaptation according to the emotional representations created during the 
reading process. In other words, the reader does not need to be able to recall each word of the 
text, but she needs to access the information and experience that she decoded and therefore 
actualized by reading the text. Within this process of recall, the reader adds her own expectation 
of that experience and mixes it with her expectation about the memory of the experiences. In 
other words, the reader does not only recreate the text, she also individualizes it; therefore, one 
cannot make accurate assumptions about how the act of imagining looks like for each reader. In 
the process of recalling and in the reading experience, adaptation theory applies. If a filmmaker 
who wants to make a movie adaptation of a novel he or she has to decide what and how the 
scenes in the movie should look like. In these decisions imagination must occur, since many 
details important for the viewer to see in a movie may simply not be described in the book. 
Therefore, as one creates a movie based on a novel, he or she needs to add information; the text 
expands. At the same time, the text often is reduced because not everything that happens in the 
book can make it to the movie. Eventually, the viewer must realize that the movie (as a text 
containing information) is very different from the novel as a text. More or less the same process 
happens in the reader’s mind when she “experiences” a story. In her imagination to the degree 
she immerses herself into the story, which may vary throughout the book, the reader creates her 
own experience alongside the text. As we saw in the third chapter, the questions the reader asks 
while reading fundamentally influence the reader’s experience of the text. 
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The validity of top-down structure building 
One of the questions that remain is whether the top-down approach of the second chapter is 
valid at all. The reason for questioning this approach lies in the fact that we consider not only the 
perspective of a reader, but also the view of an author, since we interfered with the text as a 
given and manipulated it. However, as I already touched upon, such interference is justified, 
since we “only” rearranged the order of the scenes, which ultimately in every version that exists 
has a creative aspect. Indeed, the “original” order of the scenes is simply unknown, although 
there are convincing reasons, from a historian’s perspective, to prefer certain outlines to others. 
However, we do not take the historian’s stance. In this work, we can see the effects of changing 
one single category within the reader’s interpretation, effects explained by integrating knowledge 
about the reader from the perspective of the cognitive sciences. 
In the case of Woyzeck, the reader’s interpretation results from a combination of the order in 
which he or she perceives the events in the story and the reader’s perception of time in the story. 
Only these two factors lead to the construction of causal structures within the play. The reader 
therefore actualizes the story in his or her own mind according to the structures she identifies. 
Therefore, she comes to conclusions about what kind of text or, more specifically, what subgenre 
she deals with. From the perspective of cognitive scientists, the question then arises of how the 
perception of time functions in the reader’s mind. In his article “The experience and perception 
of time,” Robin Le Poivedin introduces basic philosophical puzzles with regard to the perception 
of time: 
Insofar as time is something different from events, we do not perceive time as such, but 
changes or events in time. But, arguably, we do not perceive events only, but also their 
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temporal relations. So, just as it is natural to say that we perceive spatial distances and other 
relations between objects (I see the dragonfly as hovering above the surface of the water), it 
seems natural to talk of perceiving one event following another (the thunderclap as 
following the flash of lightning) (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/time-experience/#1, 
accessed 04/01/2014). 
In other words, it is justified to consider temporal perception or intuition not only with regard to 
real-life situations and experiences, but also in the reader’s experience of focusing on a narrative. 
In order for us to see the effect of the reader’s perception of time in the case of Woyzeck, the 
change of scenes represents an ideal case. Since there is no mediation to the reader by a narrator 
and no indication of how time evolves (except for the intrinsic information of the scenes, such as 
the appearance of someone murdered, which leads to the interpretation of a flashback regarding 
time in the story world), the reader is left on her own to figure out what happens first, what 
comes next, etc. The reader faces the events directly during her reading experience. 
 
A last notion on order 
In order to understand the Genettian term order and the overarching category time, we need 
to focus on what these categories mean and how they affect the reader and her interpretation. 
Interestingly, most approaches to categorizing genres or, more broadly, types of narratives do not 
contain specific orders or timelines of events as a criterion for distinguishing between different 
kinds of stories. However, as we have seen with the example of Woyzeck, order (and the 
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perception of the timeline in a story world) alone can change the reader’s interpretation regarding 
a subgenre. Therefore, the category of order needs to receive further attention. 
Of course, we need to keep in mind that Woyzeck as a play and as a drama contains and 
lacks features that a novel has. The lack of a narrator is a specific feature that enables us to see 
how the order in which the reader perceives the scenes can have such a huge impact. Typically, a 
narrator clearly indicates timelines and precedence or foreshadowing, which gives the reader a 
rather clear concept and perception of time in the story. Also, when a narrator is present in a 
given story, causal structures and time perception do not collapse together and are not dependent 
on the category of order, as we have experienced with Woyzeck, where, as I already mentioned, 
the categories start to dissolve.  
From this point, it would also be interesting to trace other cases of literature, maybe 
fragmentary novels, in which reordering is possible, and to narratologically analyze how 
different arrangements of the content would affect the reader’s interpretation, perception of time, 
and view on causality in the text. Such a case would show how a narrator does indeed influences 
these areas and whether the reader’s perception of these categories is based more on the 
narrator’s involvement in the story’s presentation, or whether the reader rather forms her own 
perception independently from the narrator’s mediation of the story. 
However, in the end, the fact that it is possible for a play (namely Woyzeck) to let us dissolve 
narratological categories, despite the fact that this play is a classic narrative according to 
Genette’s system of narratology, shows the boundaries of narratology. The fact that this case is 
possible emphasizes the necessity of considering the reader as more of a determining factor 
rather than the structure of the text. Therefore, we need to implement increasingly the sciences of 
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the mind into the expanded field of narratology, not only to allow us to understand better what 
happens to us when we read, but also to understand better what we read and to gain new insights 
into the text. Many scholars have started to analyze and think along the lines of where they 
implement categories and mechanisms that neuroscientists have discovered in the discipline of 
narratology. For example, David Herman lays out what the cooperation between narratology and 
cognitive sciences can look like. He even suggests that narratologists not only implement results 
of researchers of the cognitive science in narratological analyses, but also that cognitive sciences 
could start to think about how to create experiments that are motivated by narratological 
considerations and theories. In Lisa Zunshine’s Getting Inside your Head: What Cognitive 
Science Can Tell Us about Popular Culture, we can find another interesting approach of 
encountering the reader’s cognitive disposition as a necessary part of understanding (literary and) 
culturally relevant texts.2 There are many scholars who follow the lines of defining a cognitive 
narratology. As Monika Fludernik and Greta Olson describe the phenomenon of cognitive 
narratology, 
[i]n cognitive narratology, one no longer pursues the naming and the elucidation of stable 
aspects of narrative and their function. Rather than pursuing one single question, the 
researcher now sets about addressing a series of questions concerning how narratives reveal 
the phenomenology of perception, how they engage with the functions, possibilities, and 
limits of thought, and how they control the decision-making processes by which we intuit 
how stories are most likely to turn out. (5)  
                                                
2 Especially interesting is her discussion on how the viewer of a movie involuntarily projects emotions to faces seen 
on the screen. This effect could be seen as one instance where the viewer has to fill in gaps. 
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In addition to merely focusing on the text as a constant, on its structures and hierarchical 
components, we can now analyze the variables, for example, the reader as an important element 
in the actualization of text. Such a cognitive approach allows the reader to find a broader 
understanding of stories and of herself as an interpreter of narratives. In the end, we do not only 
learn how the reading of stories functions, we can also learn and discover how the reader’s mind 
works in cooperation with the story. In other words, if we continue the implementation of 
cognitive science in narratology, we might find an answer from the perspective of cognitive 
science to the question asked already by Aristotle and which I paraphrase here: why do stories fit 
the mind? 
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